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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN
FLUX: THE RISE AND FALL OF
PROBABLE CAUSE
Ronald J. Bacigal*
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean,-neither more nor
less."
Through the Looking Glass
I. INTRODUCTION
PERHAPS MORE SO than most areas of the law, attempting to com-
prehend the fourth amendment cases is rather like stepping through the
Looking Glass with Alice. Precedents and analytical approaches ap-
pear and disappear like the Cheshire Cat. Words and phrases acquire
new meanings in the context of these analytical progressions. In partic-
ular, the word "reasonable" takes on two distinct meanings in fourth
amendment analysis. Students of the fourth amendment quickly learn
that for courts and commentators "reasonableness" is both a term of art
synonymous with constitutionality and a convenient shorthand denot-
ing a process of rational analysis. Failure to distinguish reasonableness
as a process of rational thought from "reasonableness" as a standard of
constitutionally permissible behavior, however, is fatal to an attempt to
delimit the scope of fourth amendment protection. The final determi-
nation of the constitutionality of a particular search does not depend
solely on a decision by the government or by an individual police of-
ficer that the search is a reasonable intrusion under the prevailing cir-
cumstances. The history of the fourth amendment teaches that
constitutionality hinges on more than individual ad hoc decisions. Un-
fortunately, an analysis of relevant Supreme Court cases reveals that
the Court has failed to establish an objective methodology which would
facilitate the identification of constitutionally permissible searches from
among those considered reasonable in behavioral terms. As a result,
the fourth amendment currently provides no clear standard of constitu-
tional reasonableness.
The Supreme Court's attempts to delineate the parameters of
fourth amendment protection have spawned a longstanding contro-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond; B.A. 1964, Concord College, LLB. 1967, Wash-
ington & Lee University.
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versy over the relationship between the amendment's two conjunctive
clauses: the reasonableness clause and the warrant clause.' The con-
troversy has provoked such "strong and fluctuating differences of view
on the court"2 that one commentator referred to it as an "embarassing
chapter of supreme judicial schizophrenia."3 Originally, the Supreme
Court's fourth amendment analysis focused primarily on interpretation
of the warrant clause, relegating the reasonableness clause to a position
of minor importance. This "traditional probable cause" approach lim-
ited fourth amendment requirements to a showing of a valid search
warrant based on probable cause.' The reasonableness clause did not
serve to excuse the absence of probable cause nor did it require any
justification beyond probable cause for a constitutional search or
seizure.' The Supreme Court, however, subsequently placed increased
emphasis on the reasonableness clause in defining fourth amendment
requirements for a constitutional intrusion.
Dissatisfied with the inflexibility of traditional probable cause, the
Court adopted the theory that the reasonableness clause supercedes the
warrant clause.6 This view has several variations, the most extreme be-
ing that reasonableness is the sole standard for determining the consti-
i. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235 (1960).
3. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047, 1052 (1975).
4. E.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5. Prior to Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court used the reasonable-
ness clause primarily to authorize warrantless searches. The reasonableness clause was said to
excuse the absence of a warrant but not the nonexistence of probable cause. E.g., Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (when only warrantless seizure is possible due to exigent
circumstances, search is unlawful unless officer can establish probable cause).
6. Some members of the Court supported the theory that the reasonableness clause imposes
limitations on the government's power to search in addition to the requirements of the warrant
clause. See, e.g., Andressen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 493 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); War-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In that view, the warrant clause
places limitations on the government's power to search, primarily in the form of procedural re-
quirements, while the reasonableness clause is a substantive limitation. See Weinreb, Generalities
of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 47 (1974); Note, Legal Realism and Constitutionally
Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Ffth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 954 (1977). In
particular, when the government has satisfied the warrant clause requirements of probable cause,
particularity, and issuance of a warrant, the nature of the place to be searched or the items to be
seized may preclude a constitutionally reasonable search. Inherent in this view is a hierarchy of
fourth amendment protections recognizing that certain places and things require more constitu-
tional protection against government searches and seizures than others. See, e.g., McKenna, The
Constitutional Protection of Private Papers." The Role ofa Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND.
L.J. 55 (1978); Note, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth
Amendment, supra.
This greater protection may take the form of a stricter standard of probable cause, or it may
result in an absolute bar immunizing certain places and things from intrusions by government
officials. However, no Supreme Court case to date has invalidated a search or seizure when the
authorities have met the warrant clause and traditional probable cause requirements. See text
accompanying notes 174-94 infra.
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tutionality of a search. Under this approach, reasonableness becomes a
free-floating standard that supercedes the warrant clause requirements
of probable cause, particularity, and the proper issuance of a warrant.7
Thus, in South Dakota v. Opperman,8 and Wyman v. James,9 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of government intrusions
even in the absence of a warrant or a prior determination of probable
cause.'" Presumably, this formless standard of reasonableness is deter-
mined primarily, if not exclusively, by applying common sense or ra-
tional analysis to the circumstances of each case."l
A less extreme variation on the reasonableness approach regards
the warrant clause as a touchstone outlining the nature of a constitu-
tional search.'2 Accordingly, as a fourth amendment standard, the re-
quired degree of probable cause is a "sliding scale" that fluctuates with
the peculiar facts of each case. Two variants of case-by-case analysis
emerge under this theory. First, the court may analyze the totality of
the circumstances, considering compliance with the specific require-
ments of the warrant clause as one of many relevant factors.' 3 Alterna-
tively, the court may employ a doctrine of equivalent protections, in
which case constitutionality depends on whether the challenged proce-
dures provided adequate substitute safeguards which compensate for
noncompliance with the warrant clause."
Regardless of the terminology employed, under these approaches
7. See Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 458 (1976).
8. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
9. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In Wyman, the Court held that "visits" by welfare officials were not
intrusions within the purview of the fourth amendment, and in the alternative that if such "visits"
were intrusions, they did not "descend to the level of unreasonableness." Id at 318.
10. See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment." A Selective
Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1028 (1973).
11. Dissenting in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 527 (1971), Mr. Justice White
referred to "the commonsense standard of reasonableness governing search and seizure cases."
See also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959), in which the Court stated that reasona-
bleness turns on the "factual and practical considerations of everyday life. and Vale v. Loui-
siana, 399 U.S. 30, 36 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
12. This approach involves a certain amount of tail chasing, because to define reasonable-
ness the Court looks to the warrant clause, and in defining the probable cause requirement of the
warrant clause, the Court looks back to the reasonableness clause. In the words of Justice White,
"In cases in which the Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant to search be obtained, 'proba-
ble cause' is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitu-
tional mandate of reasonableness." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
13. See generally Lewis, Justice Stewart and Fourth Amendment Probable Cause. "Swing
Voter" or Participant in a "New Majority," 22 Loy. L. REv. 713 (1976).
14. The concept of equivalent protections may have originated in Chief Justice Vinson's
dissent in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), when he objected to an insistence "upon
the use of a search warrant in situations where the issuance of such a warrant can contribute
nothing to the preservation of the rights which the Fourth Amendment was intended to pro-
tect. ... Id at 714-15. Perhaps the most forthright consideration of a doctrine of equivalent
protections is Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 381-84 (1976). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
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the warrant clause is subsumed by the overriding primacy of the rea-
sonableness clause. Probable cause becomes a factor to balance along
with other circumstances to determine the constitutionality of a partic-
ular search or seizure. Inherent in these balancing approaches is the
recognition of a hierarchy of fourth amendment interests. That is, cer-
tain private places or items are deemed to require more constitutional
protection against government intrusion than others. Conversely, the
Court also recognizes that certain searches and seizures, if compelled
by strong government interests, may withstand constitutional attack by
applying a justifiably less rigorous standard.
Finding the concept of a hierarchy of fourth amendment interests
unwieldy, a number of recent articles have urged the Court to abandon
value-laden interest balancing and to return to the objective standard
of "traditional probable cause."' 5 In fact, the Court's recent holding in
Dunaway v. New York' 6 may indicate the Court's dissatisfaction with
the balancing approach. In Dunaway, a majority of the Court held that
warrant clause probable cause analysis is the "general rule" for deter-
mining the constitutionality of government intrusions, while "balanc-
ing" to determine reasonableness is the exception.' 7 Although the
Court studiously avoided all references to the objectivity of a fixed
probable cause standard,' 8 it rejected the general applicability of a bal-
ancing test in favor of the "relative simplicity and clarity" of traditional
probable cause.' 9 Accordingly, Dunaway is consistent with the theory
that traditional probable cause is the standard for searches and arrests
incident to criminal investigations while the constitutionality of lesser
government intrusions, such as administrative inspections and regula-
tory searches, is determined by a reasonableness standard.2"
15. See, e.g., Leslie, The Gradation of Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Context of Street
Detentions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 436 (1977). The author stated:
Divergence from traditional fourth amendment principles and doctrines unreasonably endan-
gers privacy-security rights historically valued as essential to the very existence of a free soci-
ety. In light of these dangers, it is time for the judiciary to reverse this process and to return
to the protection of fourth amendment rights through the use of objective standards.
See also Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality is Lost?, I I
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1077, 1086 (1978); Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion
Concept.- The Unreasonableness ofBeing Reasonable, 58 B.U.L. REV. 436, 459 (1978); Note, Auto-
mobile Spot Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 6 Rtrr.-CAM. L. REV. 85-90 (1974).
16. - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979).
17. Id at 2257.
18. The Court noted that while the probable cause standard may be a product of the balanc-
ing process, "the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is embod-
ied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." Dunaway
v. New York, - U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2257. Three weeks before Dunaway, the Court had stated
that "the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition
or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails." Bell v. Wolfish, - U.S.
-, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1884 (1979) (emphasis added).
19. - U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
20. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
chs. 3, 9, 10 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE TREATISE].
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This article will demonstrate the Supreme Court's inability to de-
velop an objective methodology to derive and apply fourth amendment
principles under either the traditional probable cause approach or the
balancing approach. A detailed analysis of traditional probable cause
will reveal that its premises are ultimately subjectively derived.2' This
examination will also show that returning to traditional probable cause
would necessitate resurrecting the unrealistic premise that an individ-
ual's privacy interest is always outweighed by the government's interest
in searching if the authorities meet a static standard of probable cause.
The article will then discuss the advent of the balancing approach and
the new set of fourth amendment premises adopted by the Court. In
addition, a consideration of these new assumptions about the nature of
fourth amendment protection and how they have affected the tradi-
tional probable cause requirements will highlight the differences be-
tween the two approaches. Finally, the article will focus on the
inadequacies of the "sliding scale" methodology the Court has used
under the balancing approach and suggest several different theories of
the fourth amendment's substance.
II. TRADITIONAL PROBABLE CAUSE
Because of the short and spotty history of the fourth amendment,
to refer to the probable cause doctrine as "traditional" creates the un-
warranted impression that it is an inveterate practice, deeply rooted in
American law.22 In fact, the term "traditional probable cause" is rather
arbitrarily applied to the Supreme Court's decisions from circa 1920 to
1967; it is a convenient label for what has always been an oversimpli-
fied view of the Court's interpretation of the warrant clause. 23 The sim-
plistic formula of traditional probable cause states that government
21. The Court conceded as much in Dunaway when Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated: "The requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent and is
embodied in the principle that seizures are 'reasonable' only if supported by probable cause." -
U.S. at -, 99 S. Ct. at 2257.
22. See generally Ely, On Discoverying Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 39 (1978).
The Court did not consider an important fourth amendment question until Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886) and Boyd is probably the antithesis of what is referred to as a traditional view
of the fourth amendment. See generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974). A sizeable body of fourth amendment precedent did not develop until
the advent of prohibition in 1920, and so-called traditional probable cause suffered an early de-
mise in 1967 with the decisions in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) and Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967). To recognize the historical dearth of cases does not diminish an appreci-
ation of the number and importance of modem fourth amendment cases: "The fourth amend-
ment is by far the most important provision of the Bill of Rights in terms of the volume of
litigation to which it gives rise in the nation's courts." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
THE SUPREME COURT 454 (1966). Accord, Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75
YALE L.J. 1161, 1169 (1966).
23. The Court contributed to this simplistic view by frequently expressing probable cause in
terms of a reasonably prudent man standard. See text accompanying notes 40-46 infra. At other
times the Court eschewed simplistic formulations of probable cause and recognized that: "The
Fourth Amendment is to be construed . . . in a manner which will conserve public interests as
No. 41
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officers must not initiate a search unless they have a reasonable belief
that seizable items are located in the place to be searched.24 For pur-
poses of analysis, this definition can be expressed in the form of three
questions which a magistrate or policeman must answer correctly
before conducting a search." First, what are you sure of: that seizable
items are located in the place to be searched. Second, how sure are
you: a reasonable belief by a reasonably prudent man. Finally, why
are you sure: sufficiently reliable information gave rise to the reason-
able belief.
A. The What of Traditional Probable Cause.- The Nature of Items
that the Government Can Seize
Traditional probable cause pictured the fourth amendment as a
monolith concerned with a single government interest: seizure of items
in furtherance of law enforcement. 26 Conversely, only a single individ-
ual right or interest was within the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tion: freedom from unreasonable government intrusions.27  The
traditional view did not contemplate a hierarchy of fourth amendment
values, nor did it engage in an open balancing of various governmental
and individual interests. The court did not admit that the government's
interest may depend on the type of crime under investigation or that an
individual's interest could vary according to the intrusiveness of the
search. Other types of government activities, such as health and safety
inspections, were beyond the amendment's coverage or at most on the
well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925).
24. Simplistic formulations of probable cause are most defensible when one remembers that
an important consideration of fourth amendment law is the need to provide magistrates and police
with clear standards for conducting a proper search. Complex and ultra-sophisticated formula-
tions of probable cause may better serve academicians but generally frustrate those who must
apply the formulations in the harsh realities of day to day law enforcement. See generaly Dwor-
kin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment." The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication]; LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudica-
tion" Versus "Standardized Procedures," 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127. But see also Haddad, Well-
Delineated Exceptions, Claims ofSham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 198
(1977), in which the author noted: "A thoughtful effort to present fourth amendment law in a
practical way demands serious attention to theory." Id at 225.
25. When police act pursuant to a warrant, the determination of probable cause is made by a
magistrate. When police act without a warrant, they initially make the probable cause determina-
tion themselves. Of course either determination is subject to after-the-fact review by a court upon
a motion to suppress evidence. See I LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 20, at 446.
26. The function of probable cause "is to guarantee a substantial probability that the inva-
sions involved in the search will be justified by discovery of offending items." Note, Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687
(1961); Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1013.
27. Whether the fourth amendment is interpreted as a matter of the individual's right to
privacy, or interest in privacy, may be significant. See text accompanying notes 174-88 infra. It is
also interesting to consider Professor Dworkin's comment that "the Constitution nowhere gives
the police a right of their own to make searches, reasonable or otherwise." Dworkin, Fact Style
Adudication, supra note 24, at 336.
[Vol. 1979
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periphery of fourth amendment jurisprudence. 28 Because this mono-
lithic view of the amendment identified only two conflicting interests,
the constitutional limitations on the government's power to search were
determined by a resolution of that single conflict.
In Warden v. Hayden,2 9 the Supreme Court resolved the conflict,
holding that when the authorities have probable cause to believe that
items are present which will further a criminal investigation, the gov-
ernment's interest in searching is always superior to an individual's in-
terest in privacy.3" Notably, the evolution of the Warden rule revealed
that the reduced scope of the fundamental fourth amendment conflict
did not obviate the need for a subjective, value-laden resolution of the
conflict between the government and the individual interest.
In Warden, the Supreme Court overruled Gouleb v. United
States,3 which had set out the "mere evidence rule" forty-six years
earlier.3 2 As elaborated by subsequent cases, the rule stated that the
government's interest in seizing contraband and fruits or instrumentali-
ties of crimes outweighs an individual's interest in these items, but that
the government's interest in "mere evidence" must yield to the individ-
ual's rights.33 This conclusion rested on the premise that the fourth
amendment protects possessory interests in private property. 34 Accord-
ingly, the Gouleb Court concluded that the government's possessory in-
terest in mere evidence is always inferior to a citizen's possessory
rights.35
The Warden Court rejected the premise that property interests de-
fine and temper the government's power to search, stating: "[T]he prin-
cipal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy
rather than property .... ."I' Discarding the property rights theory,
the Warden Court asserted that the authorities' power to search derives
from the government's interest "in obtaining evidence which would aid
in apprehending and convicting criminals."3 7 Given this new percep-
tion of the conflict between government and individual interests under
the fourth amendment, the Gouleb conclusion that the government can-
not seize mere evidence became "wholly irrational."38
To arrive at this new definition of the nature of conflicting fourth
amendment interests, however, the Warden Court did not use terms of
logic or speak of rationality. Rather, the Court stated that "this shift in
28. See, e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
29. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
30. Id at 306.
31. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
32. 387 U.S. at 302.
33. Gouleb v. United States, 255 U.S. at 309.
34. 387 U.S. at 302.
35. 255 U.S. at 309.
36. 387 U.S. at 304.
37. Id at 306.
38. Id at 302.
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emphasis from property to privacy has come about through a subtle
interplay of substantive and procedural reform; 3 9 and also "through
the interaction of the felt need to protect privacy from unreasonable
invasions and the flexibility in rulemaking made possible by the rem-
edy of exclusion."4 Obviously, the shift from property rights to the
right of privacy was not based exclusively on an objective reading of
history or the language of the Constitution.4 If the "correct" premise
of traditional probable cause was determined by assessing the subtle
interplay between conflicting interests and perceiving the felt need to
protect privacy, such a methodology seems very similar to the subjec-
tive value judgments inherent in the balancing approach.
One important distinction remains, however, that renders tradi-
tional probable cause more objective than a balancing of hierarchical
fourth amendment interests. Under the balancing approach, the Court
subjectively resolves the conflict of different government and individual
interests on a case-by-case basis. In contrast, traditional probable cause
reduces the fourth amendment to a single conflict and decides that is-
sue definitively. Thus, after initially engaging in subjective balancing,
a rule capable of objective application in future cases appears to
emerge. However, the traditional probable cause rule states that the
government's interest in searching is superior only so long as the au-
thorities have a reasonable belief that seizable items are present.4 2 Ac-
cordingly, objective application of the Court's subjectively derived
premise requires a fixed standard of certainty and reliability as the
other two components of the traditional probable cause approach.
Obvious difficulties arise from defining the fourth amendment in
terms of a single type of conflict between government and individual
interests. To speak only of the government's interest in discovering in-
criminating evidence versus the individual's interest in freedom from
unreasonably intrusive criminal investigations ignores the entire areas
of administrative searches.43 This approach homogenizes differing pri-
vacy interests such as freedom from intrusions into automobiles,
homes, and body cavities. Moreover, traditional probable cause also
generalizes varying law enforcement interests such as investigations of
petty larceny, rape, and first degree murder. Accordingly, traditional
probable cause achieves some measure of certainty at the high price of
needed flexibility.
39. Id at 304.
40. Id at 305.
41. See generaly Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219
(1965); Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REC.
N.Y.B.A. 546 (1971).
42. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 99-102 (1959).
43. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
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B The How of Traditional Probable Cause.- The Required Degree of
Certainty that Seizable Items are Present
In a simplistic formulation of traditional probable cause, the fac-
tual inquiry is whether a person of reasonable caution would be justi-
fied in concluding that seizable items were present in the place to be
searched. This standard encompasses two fourth amendment princi-
ples: (1) the government interest in searching for items in furtherance
of a criminal investigation always outweighs individual privacy inter-
ests; and (2) the government has an interest in searching for seizable
items only when it possesses the required degree of certainty that the
items are present in the place to be searched. The possible range from
which the required level of certainty emerges is a mathematical scale
from zero to one hundred percent. The Supreme Court, however, has
refrained from expressing the required level of certainty in mathemati-
cal terms, relying instead on a scale of less exact but more familiar legal
terminology. In fact, there have been "an exceedingly small number of
cases in the Supreme Court indicating what suffices for probable
cause."'  Perhaps the only certain assertion is that probable cause "lies
somewhere between bare suspicion and proof of guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt."45 Although the Court's reluctance to rely on mathemati-
cal formulations of probable cause is understandable,' the less than
forthright manner in which the Court has discussed the methodology
used to identify "reasonable belief' is cause for objection. The
Supreme Court has avoided clarifying the degree of certainty required
to satisfy this admittedly vague constitutional standard by reducing its
analysis to a factual inquiry focusing on the authorities' analysis that
gave rise to the intrusion in the case before the Court.47
44. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 70, 74 (1968).
45. Armentano, The Standardsfor Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN.
B.J. 137, 144 (1970).
Professor LaFave once suggested that the level of probable cause is "more probable than
not." LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REV. 40, 73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LaFave, Street Encounters]. He noted, however,
that "the issue is still open." I LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note 20, at 478 (1978). One student
commentator maintained that a 65% degree of likelihood should not constitute sufficient probable
cause to support a warrant for arrest, and that it is "inconceivable" that such a level of probability
could support a warrantless arrest. Note, Garbage In, Gospel Out." Establishing Probable Cause
Through Computerized Information Transmittals, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 523 (1976).
It is generally assumed that both searches and arrests require the same quantum of evidence
to establish probable cause. Thus courts cite interchangeably prior decisions regarding probable
cause to search or arrest. For example, in determining probable cause to search, Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969) referred to Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (an arrest
case) as a "suitable benchmark." See generally Haddad, supra note 24. See also Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
46. See generally Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U.
ILL. L.F. 23; Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Faconding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1978);
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:. Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329
(1971).
47. E.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
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Obviously the degree of certainty to which the authorities can
point in a given case is an inquiry vastly different than the constitution-
ally required degree of certainty. In examining the factual likelihood
that a seizable item was present in the place searched, the Supreme
Court is on strong ground in stating, "we deal with probabilities .. .
they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."48 Assessing
the probabilities in a given factual situation involves the application of
logic49 and thus the reasonable man standard is appropriate.
The "reasonable" degree of certainty in a constitutional sense,
however, has little or nothing to do with the judgment of a reasonably
prudent man. That is, a reasonable man's conclusion that it is appro-
priate to search, based on a fifty-one percent likelihood of finding seiza-
ble items, does not guarantee that the search was constitutionally
permissible under the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.
Setting the constitutionally mandated level of certainty is a complex
legal determination for a judge, not a factual question for reasonable
men.5" As a legal standard, it is independent of the method used to
assess the factual likelihood that seizable items were present prior to
the search. If the reasonable man's conclusion was the test for the con-
stitutionality of an intrusion, fourth amendment issues could be taken
from the courts and decided by juries or public opinion surveys."
Fourth amendment substance would vary according to the definition of
a reasonable search embraced by a majority of the population. The
Supreme Court, however, has shown little inclination to abandon the
traditional view that the Bill of Rights is not subject to change based on
the whims of society's current majority. 2 Thus, application of the
traditional probable cause approach requires a distinction between the
reasonable belief standard--determined by the Constitution-and the
degree of certainty that the authorities actually had--determined by
the reasonable man standard.
The Supreme Court has never articulated the proper methodology
for deriving this constitutional standard. Apparently, the Court once
again found no guidance in the language of the amendment itself and
48. Id.
49. But see Tribe, supra note 46.
50. In Steel v. United States, 267 U.S. 505 (1924), the Court held that the existence of proba-
ble cause is "a question of fact and law for the court and not for the jury." Id at 511.
51. Such an approach led one commentator to assert that "the determination of reasonable-
ness of a search by the Court instead of by the jury is probably explicable by the fact that the
question usually comes up in relation to admissibility of evidence, in which connection questions of
fact are commonly decided by the court itself." (emphasis added) Waite, Reasonable Search and
Research, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 625 n.7 (1938). See also McKay, Sef-lncriminalion andthe New
Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194. The author pointed out that the fourth amendment "con-
fines the dispute to thefactual aspects of what is 'reasonable'.. (emphasis added).
52. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 358.
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considered it necessary to resort to a subjective value judgment.5 3 The
more important inquiry, however, is whether the Court has applied the
reasonable belief standard uniformly and objectively. To the extent
that the reasonable belief standard varies according to the particular
conflict of government and private interests, the Court has recognized a
hierarchy of fourth amendment interests.
In theory, traditional probable cause and its monolithic view of
government and individual fourth amendment interests mandates a
fixed standard for the required degree of certainty. 4 It appears, how-
ever, that the Court has not always applied a uniform standard. In
Brinegar v. United States"5 Justice Jackson suggested that the Court
varied the standard of probable cause sub silentio according to the
gravity of the offense.56 Moreover, some have suggested that the Court
lowered the standard of probable cause after Mapp v. Ohio5 7 to temper
the effect of the exclusionary rule on state law enforcement agencies.5 8
In addition, the Court has indicated in dicta that the standard of proba-
ble cause may be lower for searches undertaken pursuant to a war-
rant,59 to encourage the authorities to resort to magistrates before
searching.6" Given the vagueness of the reasonable belief standard,
however, it is impossible to ascertain whether significant deviations
from a fixed certainty requirement have occurred.
53. Sometimes within a single sentence or two the Court will refer to probable cause as a
practical matter for reasonably prudent men, and then also refer to probable cause as a complex
compromise of competing societal interests. In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), for
example, the Court stated that the actions of police officers "must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a
practical, non-technical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accom-
modating. . . often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement.
To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."
Id at 176. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
54. The brief of the N.A.A.C.P. filed in Terry, referred to probable cause as "the objective,
solid and efficacious method of reasoning .. " See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 394. Probable
cause "was interpreted to require a uniform quantum of pre-search information for every search
and seizure. However great or slight the invasion, or however pressing the community interest at
stake, the threshold level of information required was the same." Note, Search and Seizure in the
Supreme Court.- Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 680 (1961).
55. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
56. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451, 460 (1948). The courts may also vary the emergency exception to the warrant clause accord-
ing to whether the emergency involves criminal activity or "civil" emergencies. See Bacigal, The
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 249 (1975).
57. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. Note, Probable Cause: The Federal Standard, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 502, 515 (1964). An
alternative to varying the level of probable cause would be to treat probable cause as the constant
and vary the application of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); and LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Stan-
dardized Procedures," supra note 24, at 156.
59. For a thorough discussion of the circumstances in which a warrantless search is constitu-
tional, see Haddad, supra note 24.
60. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
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C. The Why of Traditional Probable Cause. The Informational Basis
of the Governmentr' Reasonable Belief
Once the traditional approach defines the what and how of proba-
ble cause as a reasonable belief that seizable items are present, all that
remains is the question of why the reasonably prudent man came to
that reasonable belief. The line of cases from Draper v. United States6'
through Spinelli v. United States,62 demonstrates the Court's insistence
on "objective" facts to establish probable cause, as opposed to affidavits
which merely set out subjective facts such as conclusions or a "bald and
unilluminating assertion of suspicion ... .
The Court has often stated that the why requirement of probable
cause prevents the authorization of searches on the basis of suspicions,
hunches, or "loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact."64 Once the Court
decided to assess the authorities' degree of certainty by applying the
reasonable man standard, a record of the objective facts available to
the intruding agents became obligatory. Affidavits containing only
subjective conclusions preclude effective review based on an objective
prudent man standard. 65 Accordingly, the need for an objective infor-
mational basis is logically deducible from the Court's definition of rea-
sonable belief. Determining the type of facts that the authorities may
consider is not, however, a simple matter of logical deduction.
Early Supreme Court cases contained dicta to the effect that the
authorities could only consider evidence admissible at trial in establish-
ing probable cause. In Brinegar v. United States,6 6 however, the Court
made it clear that affidavits relevant to probable cause are subject to a
much lower standard and may be based on information that would, in
fact, be inadmissible as evidence.67 Moreover, in Jones v. United
States,68 the Supreme Court held that hearsay evidence could establish
probable cause "so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay
is presented. ' '69 Brinegar and Jones freed probable cause from the con-
straints of admissibility standards and substituted substantial reliability
as the new standard.7 ° Again the Court was quick to supply a nebulous
standard with which to measure the informational basis of the govern-
61. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
62. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
63. Id at 414.
64. Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 355, 357 (1931).
65. As Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), "[i]f the court is
not informed of the facts upon which the arresting officers acted, it cannot properly discharge that
function." 379 U.S. at 96.
66. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
67. Id at 174-75.
68. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
69. Id at 269. See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 614 (1974).
70. With regard to hearsay, Professor LaFave suggests that substantial reliability means "it
is more probable than not that the informant's information is correct." LaFave, "Case-by-Case
Adjudications" Versus "Standardized Procedures," supra note 24, at 76.
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ment's reasonable belief. As it had done in its formulation of the other
components of traditional probable cause, the Court had little to say
about the methodology from which the standard had evolved.
The two pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas7' is often cited as provid-
ing the traditional probable cause standard of substantial reliability.
The first part of the Aguilar test requires that the information be logi-
cally relevant to the conclusion that seizable items are present. 72 Sec-
ond, the information must be credible and accurate in the judgment of
the reasonably prudent man.73 The first prong of Aguilar bears close
attention.
The Federal Rules of Evidence define logically relevant evidence
as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence. . . . -7 To say
that an item of evidence has logical probativeness and is therefore logi-
cally relevant, however, does not mean that the evidence is automati-
cally admissible at trial. The concept of legal relevance excludes
logically relevant evidence when its probative value is outweighed by
collateral considerations such as the evidence's prejudicial effect. 7' The
essence of legal relevance is the need to assess the collateral conse-
quences of admitting an item of evidence and to balance those conse-
quences against the information's logical probativeness.76
Under the traditional probable cause approach, courts do not con-
sider the collateral consequences of basing a search warrant on a par-
ticular piece of information. The substantial reliability standard is
designed to engender total objectivity.
The Court, however, has yet to face a difficult case that tested this
principle. Suppose, for example, that the police sought to justify road-
block searches by offering statistical information revealing that, at cer-
tain times of night, there is a fifty-seven percent chance that a black
driver passing a checkpoint is armed with a deadly weapon. In terms
of logical relevance it makes no difference that the rational inference
that seizable items are present is drawn from statistics rather than from
71. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
72. 378 U.S. at 113-14.
73. Id at 114-15.
74. FED. R. EvID. 401.
75. "Of course the crime statistics show that the crime rate is higher among Negroes and
among the poor, but that is just what worries me--that statistics and appearances will be held
against individuals, and that the police in their contacts with the populace will treat some groups
differently from others." Reich, supra note 22, at 1164. See generaly, Comment, Minority Groups
And The Fourth Amendment Standard Of Certitude.- United States v. Oritz and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 733 (1976).
76. Rule 403 Federal Rules of Evidence provides "although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
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specific facts." Moreover, it is not unlikely that the authorities could
scientifically demonstrate that race is a probative factor bearing on
probable cause in some types of cases. One cannot rationally argue
that race is never logically probative on probable cause issues.78 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court will eventually have to decide the propri-
ety of reducing the objectivity of the substantial reliability test in favor
of a standard that allows some consideration of collateral conse-
quences.79
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT TRANSITION: THE SHIFT TO A
BALANCING APPROACH
Traditional probable cause and its concept of a monolithic fourth
amendment did not openly balance conflicting government and indi-
vidual interests. Whatever balancing occurred took place in deciding
the scope of the fourth amendment or sub silentio. ° The courts spoke
of the components of traditional probable cause-presence of seizable
items, reasonable belief, and reliable information-not as products of
balancing of interests, but rather as absolute requirements presumably
found in the history or language of the amendment. As constitutional
givens, the what, how, and why of probable cause were useful though
simplistic inquiries with which the court could factually determine
probable cause. Moreover, they were practical guides for the average
policeman or magistrate requiring only a modicum of common sense
and rational analysis."
The simplicity of traditional probable cause, however, was
purchased at a high price. Socially productive government activities
that could not comport with the rigid requirements of traditional prob-
able cause had to be found either unconstitutional or outside of the
coverage of the fourth amendment. Notably, once the Court declared a
particular activity beyond the scope of the fourth amendment, the un-
derlying conflict between government and private interests was no
longer subject to constitutional regulation. The Supreme Court faced
this dilemma in Frank v. Maryland,82 in which the validity of a govern-
77. "/.411 factual evidence is ultimately 'statistical,' and all legal proof ultimately 'probabal-
istic' . . . ." Tribe, supra note 46, at 1330 n.2. Statistical evidence differs from other forms of
evidence in that it may be misused in ways that other forms of evidence might not. See, e.g.,
People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). But this is no more than a
recognition that all distinct forms of evidence are susceptible to distinct methods of misuse.
78. "lIt would be foolish to contend that race alone could never provide a basis for a stop-
ping .... A Negro in an exclusive white residential area, a white person in Chinatown, or an
American Indian in a Negro area might all be stopped if a member of their race had just commit-
ted an offense in the immediate vicinity." LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 45, at 81 n.2 10.
See also Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1041-42.
79. See note 75 supra.
80. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
81. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959).
82. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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ment health inspection program was tested. The health inspectors ob-
viously could not satisfy the traditional probable cause requirements of
specific facts establishing a reasonable belief as to the specific location
of seizable items. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the inspec-
tion and maintained the integrity of the traditional probable cause
standard by holding that health inspections are not searches within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.83
The Court's overruling of Frank in Camara v. Municipal Court84 is
generally regarded as the beginning of the fall of the monolithic view of
the fourth amendment.8 5 To provide a constitutional framework for
regulating a variety of government intrusions, the Court adopted the
balancing approach.86 Recognizing that diverse government interests
engender different types of government intrusions, the Court articu-
lated a sliding scale of probable cause to accommodate conflicts be-
tween particular government and individual interests. These
government interests include, but are not limited to, deterring criminal
behavior, 7 maintaining moral equilibrium (ranging from helping
drunks to harassing prostitutes),88 assisting innocent citizens in clearing
themselves of suspicion,89 curbing the "juvenile problem", 90 and ac-
quiring information with which to lobby the legislature. 9' On the other
side of the balancing process is the variety of individual interests in
various forms of privacy, which include: privacy in various physical
locales, such as homes, 92 autos, 93 and telephone booths;94 privacy in
personal papers;95 privacy in erecting "an unbreachable wall of dignity
83. 359 U.S. at 372-73. See Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1011.
84. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
85. Mr. Justice Clark referred to Camara in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 547 (1967)
as creating a "newfangled" warrant system. Camara creates "a system of warrant issuance which
in reality leaves the probable cause standard behind it virtually nullified .. " Comment, Consti-
tutional Law-Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: the Definition of Probable
Cause in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 36 U. Mo. KANSAS
CiTy L. REV. 111, 131 (1968). See also Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23
ALA. L. REV. 287, 313 (197 1); LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 45. Greenberg, supra note 10,
at 1012.
86. LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 45, at 54. Dissenting in Camara, Mr. Justice
Clark stated that the majority had accepted in the guise of probable cause what it purported to
reject in overruling Frank v. Maryland: that administrative searches do not portend as much harm
to individual privacy as do criminal investigatory searches, therefore these "less intrusive"
searches can take place under lower standards. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 554.
87. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1967). See Reich, supra note 22, at 1171.
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 13-14. See also Cook, supra note 85, at 298.
89. E.g., People v. Morales, 22 N.Y.2d 55, 238 N.E.2d 307, 290 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1968).
90. People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956).
91. See Reich, supra note 22, at 1166.
92. In upholding a warrantless arrest in public, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976), reserved the question of whether a warrant is required before officers may enter a private
dwelling to arrest an occupant. Id at 418 n.16.
93. E.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
94. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
95. Andressen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
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and reserve against the entire world;" 96 privacy in "letting one's face go
slack, or scratching wherever one itches."97
The recognition of a hierarchy of government and private interests
has altered the basic inquiries that formerly resolved fourth amend-
ment issues. The balancing approach entails new concepts concerning
the nature of the government's interest, the required degree of certainty
that an intrusion will further that purpose, and the integrity of the in-
formation upon which the government has based its belief that a search
will accomplish its goal.
A. Conflicting Government and Private Interests Under the Balancing
Approach
Camara and its progeny changed the what of probable cause from
the limited and objective question of whether a search will produce
seizable items to the determination of whether a search is productive in
a broader sociological sense. That is, the test for a permissible search
became whether "a valid public interest justifies the [particular] intru-
sion [contemplated by the authorities]." 98 Abandoning the principle
that the presence of seizable items is the exclusive justification for a
search, the Camara Court outlined a process of balancing diverse inter-
ests, on a case-by-case basis, to determine if an intrusion was constitu-
tionally reasonable. In rejecting the traditional probable cause
approach, the Court described the fourth amendment inquiry, asserting
that, "there can be no ready test for determining [constitutional] rea-
sonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the in-
vasion which the search entails."' 99
While reformulating probable cause in this manner, the Supreme
Court tried to maintain an appearance of objectivity by retaining the
reasonably prudent man standard. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court de-
scribed this approach, stating: "[I]t is imperative that the facts be judg-
ed against an objective standard: would the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropri-
ate?""io
The sleight of hand in that statement bears close attention. Under
the traditional approach to probable cause, the Court had derived the
constitutional principle that the government interest in conducting
fourth amendment searches is always superior to private interests; it
had then used the reasonable man standard to apply this concept to the
96. Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY 17 (M. Korvitz & C. Rossiter
eds. 1958).
97. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 35 (1968).
98. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 539.
99. Id at 536-37.
100. 392 U.S. at 21-22.
[Vol. 1979
No. 4] RISE AND FALL OF PROBABLE CAUSE 779
facts of each case. The reasonable man standard was suitable for de-
ciding if the presence of seizable items was likely enough to engender a
legitimate government interest in searching.' 0' This methodology is,
however, totally inappropriate for deciding if a search is constitution-
ally reasonable under the balancing approach. The Terry Court was
misguided in its suggestion that a reasonably prudent police officer
could objectively strike the constitutionally appropriate balance of con-
flicting government and privacy interests in each case.' 02 Moreover, it
is equally misguided to suggest that this standard of probable cause is
objective and uniform on the assumption that all reasonably prudent
men will inevitably strike the same balance given the same facts. '0 3 In
fact, the reasonable man standard is useful only to discern whether a
particular intrusion violates the principles or customs currently ac-
cepted by a majority of individuals in our society. Accordingly, to the
extent that the fourth amendment embodies more than merely the cur-
rent mores and existing practices approved by the majority, the reason-
ably prudent man is a defective standard for deriving constitutional
concepts of appropriateness and reasonableness.'O°
Accordingly, the post-Terry balancing approach requires the
Court to derive a premise of constitutional law in each case by resolv-
ing the specific conflict between government and individual interests
before the Court. 05 For example, the Court would have to decide
whether the fourth amendment decrees that the government interest in
a health inspection is superior to the privacy interest in a dwelling. The
Court's methodology in deriving these constitutional premises, how-
ever, has remained unarticulated. The Court's references to the reason-
able man standard are misleading. Employing this methodology to
derive the fundamental constitutional balance of competing interests is
even more futile than the Court's prior attempt to use the reasonable
man standard to apply the monolothic fourth amendment principles of
traditional probable cause. Altering the what of probable cause by rec-
101. See text accompanying note 44-51 supra.
102. Terry's statement regarding a belief "that the action taken was appropriate" is a mean-
ingless generality to the police officer on the street. LaFave, Street Encounters, rupra note 45, at
64.
103. A judge, like the rest of us, will not often find that the community's assessment of reason-
ableness differs from his own assessment. "The distinction between the subjective or individual
and the objective or general conscience, in the field where the judge is not limited by established
rules, is shadowy and evanescent, and tends to become one of words and little more." B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 110 (1921). The Supreme Court has noted that an
unstructured determination of reasonableness is often merely a statement of personal values. See
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
104. According to Professor Ely, "It simply makes no sense to employ the value judgments of
the majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority."
Ely, supra note 22, at 52.
105. In addition, the margin by which the government interest must outweigh the individual
interest is a matter of constitutional interpretation, not a matter of pure mathematics. That is, a
margin of 70 to 30 might be required by the Constitution, thus a mathematical margin of 55. to 45
would be constitutionally inadequate.
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ognizing a hierarchy of government and private interests necessitates a
subjective judgment to discover the constitutionally appropriate bal-
ance of these interests in each case. 10
6
B. The How of Probable Cause Under the Balancing Approach." The
Required Degree of Certainty
Under traditional probable cause, the required degree of certainty
that seizable items would be found was denominated "reasonable be-
lief." In the rhetoric of the fourth amendment cases, this level of
probability lies somewhere between "mere suspicion" and "beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 7 While reasonable belief could not be defined
with any precision, it was, at least in theory,10 8 an unchanging stan-
dard. Ostensibly, reasonable belief was a fixed standard that courts
could apply uniformly to determine if the government had an interest
in searching for items related to a crime. Any failure to pin down rea-
sonable belief with precision was due to failings of perception, and not
due to a shifting standard of reasonable belief. Theoretically, the elu-
sive creature that was reasonable belief stayed right where the Consti-
tution put it. We simply did not know how to pin down and express its
exact and unchanging position.
When the traditional monolithic view of the fourth amendment
gives way to a hierarchy of various government and individual inter-
ests, the Constitution must resolve each unique conflict as it arises. The
differing weights of the competing interests in each case necessitate a
flexible standard for the required degree of certainty that the govern-
ment intrusion will accomplish its purpose. Under this approach, the
required level of certainty becomes much more elusive. It not only
changes in degree according to the particular balance of government
and private interest; it also changes its name.
At present it is difficult to list the various terms that courts have
used to describe the degree of certainty required by the balancing ap-
proach. Expressions such as reasonable belief, reasonable suspicion, °9
reasonable certainty,"10 non-whimsical suspicion,"' real suspicion," 2
clear indication, ' ' some knowledge, "14 and mere possibility' 15 have all
been used, often without agreement as to their relative positions on a
106. E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
107. See note 45 supra.
108. See note 54 supra.
109. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
110. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966).
111. People v. De Baur, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976).
112. Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1966).
113. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 759 (1966).
114. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1966).
115. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 739, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 404 (1972).
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scale of probable cause.' 1 6 Because of the complex valuational judg-
ments involved, a court may find it nearly impossible to verbalize the
balance of competing interests struck in any case.' 1 7 Consistency of
language and consistency within the framework of an existing scale,
however, need not be sacrificed in that difficult process. The Supreme
Court's recognition of a sliding scale of probable cause should be fol-
lowed by a clear and universal understanding of the positions on that
scale. With the parameters of the fourth amendment thus established,
the judiciary should define the relative position" I 8 of each formulation
of probable cause. If the courts felt compelled to place each verbaliza-
tion of the requied degree of certainty in its proper position on the
scale, coining a new phrase to resolve each new or difficult factual situ-
ation would no longer be such an attractive solution.
Although clarification of the relative positions of "suspicion" and
"belief," for example, contributes to linguistic uniformity and consis-
tency, it does not define the degree of certainty required in each unique
conflict between government and individual interests. For purposes of
the fourth amendment, the important constitutional consideration is
the distinction between "mere" suspicion and "reasonable" suspicion,
or between "mere" belief and "reasonable" belief. The concept of rea-
sonableness is the significant legal determination; references to belief,
suspicion and justification are surplusage. In fact, careful scrutiny of
the Supreme Court's usage of the relevant terms reveals that mere be-
lief is no better than mere suspicion, while in some situations reason-
able suspicion is every bit as good as reasonable belief." 9 Moreover,
"reasonable" typically appears as a conclusory label after the Court has
struck the fourth amendment balance in favor of the government. As
such, the reasonableness of the belief or suspicion is the ultimate an-
swer; it is not a methodology for assessing the sufficiency of probable
cause.
Some courts have attempted to use reasonableness as a methodol-
ogy for identifying sufficient probable cause; the approach has pro-
duced startling results. As a methodology, the reasonable man
standard reduces the required degree of certainty to a showing of ra-
tional good faith on the part of the searcher. Thus, some lower courts
have concluded that probable cause requires only "some basis from
which the court can determine that the [intrusion] was not arbitrary or
116. For example, while some commentators appear to agree that the Court's use of the term
"clear indication" in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), connoted a higher standard
than reasonable belief, at least one court viewed it as a lower standard. See Rivas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (1966).
117. Obviously the legal process places limits on the subtlety and sophistication of the lan-
guage it uses. See Parker, A Defnition ofPrivacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
118. For a discussion of the question of the range of the sliding scale, see text accompanying
notes 142-96 infra.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
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harassing."' 2 ° To say that probable cause requires something more
than whimsy or caprice serves one of the purposes of the fourth amend-
ment: to protect individuals from arbitrary government intrustions
upon privacy. 12 1 In terms of traditional probable cause, even a five
percent likelihood that seizable items are present demonstrates that the
basis for the search is rational and not wholly arbitrary. This standard,
however, is clearly inconsistent with the constitutional premise of the
balancing approach that certain privacy interests outweigh some legiti-
mate government interests. Viewed in this light, the right to privacy
cannot be set aside merely because the government offers a rational
justification for the intrusion. Rather, in keeping with a sliding scale of
probable cause, to deny an individual the right to a type or degree of
privacy requires a specific degree of justification.
Accordingly, to determine which justifications are sufficient for a
certain type of intrusion requires something other than objective ra-
tionality. The resolution of this issue depends on an assessment of the
comparative social utility of allowing or prohibiting such intrusions.
Moreover, the court's assessment of the government's interest in search-
ing entails a consideration of the purpose of the search and the likeli-
hood that the intrusion would accomplish its social objective. Thus,
when probable cause is viewed as a multitude of compromises which
resolves a multitude of conflicting government and individual interests,
the required degree of certainty becomes a flexible standard that is part
of the balance or compromise itself.
C. Discerning the Integrity of the Government's Information.- The
Why of Probable Cause Under the Balancing Approach
The why of traditional probable cause allowed the authorities to
consider all "substantially reliable" information to establish a reason-
able belief that seizable items were present at the site of the search. To
meet this standard, the authorities' information had to be reasonably
accurate and logically relevant. 2 2 After adopting the balancing ap-
proach, the Supreme Court frequently indicated that the implementa-
tion of a sliding scale of probable cause did not alter the nature of the
information upon which the authorities may base their reasonable be-
lief. In Peters v. New York, 23 for example, the Court stated that "spec-
ificity, reliability, and objectivity [remain] the touchstone of permissible
governmental action under the fourth amendment."' 124 That language,
120. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966). See also People v. DeBaur, 40
N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976). Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)
(good faith on arresting officer's part does not satisfy fourth amendment).
121. See Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment,
46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 555 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bacigal, Observations].
122. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
123. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
124. Id at 61 n.20. See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) ("spe-
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however, does not mirror reality. The Court's actual application of the
sliding scale of probable cause has changed the type of information
considered, particularly with regard to the touchstones of reliability
and specificity.
To the extent that the objectivity touchstone allows the authorities
to consider all logically relevant information, that standard has re-
mained unaltered under the balancing approach. The Court continues
to reject a legal relevance standard and, accordingly, will not disallow
consideration of particular types of information because of collateral
considerations such as prejudice. Thus, in United States v. Martinez-
Fuertes125 the Court unhesitatingly approved the individual agent's
consideration of the logical probativeness of racial characteristics and
refused to consider the potentially inflamatory aspects of condoning the
use of this information.'26 Logical relevance, therefore, remains the
sine qua non of objectivity. The touchstones of specificity and reliabil-
ity have, however, been transformed by the sliding scale approach.
The balancing approach has imparted some flexibility to the
courts' determination of what information is sufficiently reliable to
merit consideration in establishing probable cause. In Adams v. Wil-
liams,127 for example, the Supreme Court recognized that different
types of information vary as to probativeness and reliability. The
Court stated that, "[olne simple rule will not cover every situation."1 28
On that basis, the Adams Court upheld a police officer's use of an in-
formant's unverified tip to justify a stop and frisk. Recognizing that
this information may not have satisfied the traditional reliability re-
quirement of Aguilar v. Texas, 129 the Court nonetheless believed that,
"the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the of-
ficer's forcible stop of [the suspect]."' 30 Presumably, the Aguilar stan-
dard of reliability remains in effect for traditional full-scale arrests and
searches, while Adams's lesser indicia of reliability will suffice to justify
a stop and frisk's lesser intrusion.
The Court's increased willingness to consider statistical informa-
tion provides further evidence that the sliding scale analysis has pro-
duced a flexible reliability requirement. Under this new formulation of
probable cause, intrusiveness of the search may determine the extent to
cific articulable facts"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 15 (1968) ("objective evidentiary justification").
See generally Armentano, supra note 45, at 167-68; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1015.
125. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
126. Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Powell stated: "even if it be assumed that [such]
referrals [to the secondary inspection area] are made largely on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation." Id at 563. See generally Comment, Minority
Groups and the Fourth Amendment Standard of Certitude. United States v. Ortiz and United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, II HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 733, 748-62 (1976).
127. 407 U.S. 143 (1973).
128. Id at 147.
129. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
130. 407 U.S. at 147.
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which the authorities can rely on statistics as a basis for their reason-
able belief.'3 ' To some extent, all information is based on probabili-
ties. Even under the traditional, monolithic view of probable cause, the
Court had approved the authorities' use of "soft" statistics such as the
probabilities associated with high crime areas and the past criminal
conduct of the suspect. 132 Whatever the relationship may be between
the Court's consideration of statistical information and the reliability
standard, however, the increased use of statistics has most directly af-
fected the specificity touchstone of probable cause.
Courts and commentators have long recognized the problems in-
volved in determining the proper role of statistical information in
fourth amendment jurisprudence. '3 3 In the context of traditional prob-
able cause analysis, the government's belief that seizable items were
present could be established through "adjudicative facts" such as an
officer's report that he saw contraband in the suspect's apartment.
When the Supreme Court changed the formulation of the fourth
amendment inquiry from the likelihood that seizable items were pres-
ent to the appropriateness of the intrusion, 34 the type of information
needed to establish probable cause also changed. 35 Under the balanc-
ing approach the Court addresses broad policy questions, assigning
weights to conflicting government and individual interests. This in-
quiry necessitates reliance on broad factual generalizations or "legisla-
tive facts." Thus, the traditional requirement of specific facts
establishing a specific likelihood as to the presence of specific seizable
items has given way to increased use of statistics in relation to general
131. Compare United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) ("Officers on roving
patrol may stop vehicles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts .. ") with United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) ("the intrusion here is sufficiently minimal that
no particularized reason need exist to justify it .. "). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) which suggest that greater specificity will be re-
quired for more intrusive searches. Although Berger and Stanford refer to the specificity of the
warrant, the warrant's specificity is contingent upon the specificty of the facts establishing proba-
ble cause. See text accompanying notes 122-30 supra, and 132-39 infra.
132. As to the relevance of; (1) geographic locale, see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
(1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 159 (1824);
(2) previous criminal activity, see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and (3) time of day, see
People v. Cruppi, 265 Cal. App. 2d 9, 71 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1968); White v. United States, 271 F.2d 823
(D.C. Cir. 1959).
133. In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 523, 552 (1967) (Clark, J., dissenting), Mr. Justice
Clark chided the majority for its failure to cite "empirical statistics on attitudes where consent
must be obtained." It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Clark felt justified in citing "human
nature being what it is.. for the proposition that most citizens will refuse to consent. 1d at
552.
134. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
135. See, e.g., Palmer v. State, 14 Md. App. 159, 169, 286 A.2d 572, 578 (1972) ('Wo valuable
socialpurpose could conceivably be served by extending the protection of the Fourth Amendment
to a thief in the enjoyment of the stolen automobile.") (emphasis in original). See generally
LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967
SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23-25 [hereinafter cited as LaFave, Administrative Searches].
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types of intrusions. 36 In United States v. Robinson, 137 and Pennsylvania
v. Mimms,13 8 for example, the government asserted a broad interest in
the protection of police officers from attacks by armed motorists. In
both cases, the Supreme Court upheld police intrusions designed to fur-
ther that interest despite the absence of evidence that the motorists in
question were armed. In its resolution of this broad policy question,
the Court was required to make factual generalizations about the dan-
gers faced by the police as a group and about the intrusion upon the
privacy of all motorists. To resolve the conflict between these broad
interests, the Court relied on general statistics to justify intrusions upon
motorists as a class.'
39
In its emphasis on balancing broad, conflicting interests, the slid-
ing scale analysis greatly diminishes the certainty that had been associ-
ated with traditional probable cause's factual determination of whether
seizable items were present. Having no choice but to act "in the pres-
ence of empirical uncertainty"' 4 ° the Court has altered the standard of
substantial reliability to consider that imperfect generalized informa-
tion. Thus, the why of probable cause has changed dramatically under
the balancing approach. The degree of intrusion involved in a particu-
lar search will in fact vary the standard of accuracy which the Court
will impose on the government's information. In addition, the Court
has lessened the required specificity of the information to permit con-
sideration of broad factual generalizations. Accordingly, substantial
reliability is no longer a fixed standard; rather, it fluctuates as one part
of the fourth amendment balance.
Thus, under the balancing approach, the what, how, and why stan-
dards of traditional probable cause have been reduced to mere consid-
erations that serve as inputs in a court's attempt to strike the proper
136. Dissenting in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), Justice Stevens attacked this
generalized approach, stating: "the millions of traffic stops that occur every year are not fungi-
ble." Id at 121 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Kurland, The Private I, The U. CH. MAGAZINE 7,
36 (Autumn 1976), in which the author states: "[w]ithout individuality, there is no function for
privacy. When we become fungibles to be manipulated by government, there can be no recogni-
tion of idiosyncracies, no private realms to husband against intrusion."
Of course all individuals are somewhat unique, and all individuals share certain common
characteristics. The relevant issue is to decide when the law will focus on similarities and when it
will focus on differences. As Professor Amsterdam succinctly put it:
any number of categories, however shaped, is too few to encompass life and too many to
organize it manageably. The question remains at what level of generality and in what shape
rules should be designed in order to encompass all that can be encompassed without throwing
organization to the wolves.
Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 377.
137. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
138. 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam).
139. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). But see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) where the Court
noted that what is required is "probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles."
Id at 51.
140. Ely, supra note 22, at 31.
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fourth amendment balance. By implicitly recognizing a hierarchy of
fourth amendment interests, the Supreme Court altered the what of
probable cause from the adjudicative fact that seizable items were pres-
ent to the policy determination that the government's purpose out-
weighed the individual's interest in privacy. When the judiciary views
the justification for an intrusion as a matter of balancing conflicting
interests, the balancing process becomes the all-encompassing stan-
dard. In addition, the what, how, and why of probable cause lose their
value as a particularized methodology for resolving fourth amendment
issues. 1' Under this approach, once the Court determines that the con-
stitutional balance favors the government interest, the level of certainty
is automatically denominated "reasonable," and the information that
the authorities considered is labeled "reliable."
IV. EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON THE OPERATION OF THE SLIDING
SCALE OF PROBABLE CAUSE: THE EXISTENCE OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT ABSOLUTES?
Professor Amsterdam once wryly observed that recognition of a
sliding scale of probable cause would produce more slide than scale. 142
As a matter of case law, the observation has proved accurate because
the courts have focused on the lower end of the scale of probable cause.
Only in commentaries 43 and judicial dicta 44 can one find discussion
of the possibility that, in a particular case, the balancing approach
could yield a standard stricter than traditional probable cause.
Dissenting in Gooding v. United States,'45 Justice Marshall confi-
dently stated: "It is by now established fourth amendment doctrine
that increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to
justify increasingly intrusive searches."'' 46 In support of this statement
he cited Camara, Terry, and Couch v. United States,147 all of which in
fact applied a less stringent standard than traditional probable cause.
The Supreme Court has never held that a particular type of intrusion
requires more than traditional probable cause to satisfy the fourth
amendment.' 48 Thus, Justice Marshall could not cite to precedent
141. The balancing of conflicting interests becomes "a sort of universal solvent ... for
resolving all constitutional questions ...... White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking
About People, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 167.
142. Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 394.
143. See, e.g., McKenna, supra note 6.
144. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
145. 416 U.S. 430, 461-69 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. Id at 464.
147. 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Some lower courts have required more than traditional probable cause for intrusions
into the body. See generally Note, Search and Seizure." Compelled Surgical Intrusions?, 27 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 305 (1975); Note, Fourth Amendment Balancing and Searches Into the Body, 31 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1504 (1977).
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when stating:
[the sliding scale] is not a one-way street to be used only to water
down the requirement of probable cause when necessary to au-
thorize government intrusions. In some situations. . . this princi-
ple requires a showing of additional justification for a search over
and above the ordinary showing of probable cause. 1
49
Although no Supreme Court case has required more than tradi-
tional probable cause, the process of balancing conflicting interests
does not inherently preclude probable cause from "rising" above the
traditional requirement. The same balancing process that identifies
lesser intrusions justified by lesser probable cause presumably may
identify greater intrusions which must be satisfied by greater probable
cause. Any limitations on the level of probable cause produced by a
balancing of interests must come from an external source, and not from
the internal operation of the balancing process itself.
Accordingly, there remains for consideration the possibility that
external limitations restrict the scope of the sliding scale of probable
cause. In particular, the balancing model may be inapplicable to cer-
tain types of searches that are either absolutely reasonable because of a
compelling government interest, or, alternatively, absolutely unreason-
able because of an extraordinary interest in privacy.
In defining the scope of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court
has often indicated that probable cause has an absolute lower limit;
that is, certain government activities require no form of probable cause
or justification because they occur beyond the coverage of the amend-
ment. 50 The Court initially established the methodology for determin-
ing the scope of the fourth amendment in Olmstead v. United States.'5'
Olmstead held that fourth amendment protection covered only physi-
cal intrusions into constitutionally protected areas that result in the
seizure of a tangible item. In keeping with the traditional approach to
fourth amendment jurisprudence, the Court set out a firm standard, 5 2
leaving for case-by-case determination only the question of whether the
facts rationally and objectively met this test. 1 53
When Katz v. United States'54 overruled Olmstead and cut the
fourth amendment free from the fixed requirement of physical intru-
sion, the Court was left without an established categorization of what
interests came within the scope of fourth amendment protection.
149. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. See Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satiofed"
The Neglected Threshold of "So Wat?", 1977 So. ILL. U.L.J. 75.
151. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
152. The standard was firm in the sense that a trespass was required; the definition of a tres-
pass for purposes of the fourth amendment, however, was ambiguous. See White, supra note 147,
at 173.
153. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
154. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Katz's dramatic language that the amendment "protects people, not
places"' 55 eliminated the old standard of physical trespass into consti-
tutionally protected areas; in its stead, however, Katz offered only a
nebulous new standard of protecting "those expectations of privacy
which society recognizes as reasonable."' 56 That word again-reason-
able-led many lower courts into confusing reasonableness as a factual
matter with reasonableness as a constitutional determination.' 57 Thus,
many courts misread the language of Katz as establishing the reason-
ably prudent man standard as the test of fourth amendment coverage.
It has elsewhere been shown at great length that the judiciary cannot
determine the coverage of the fourth amendment by recourse to the
simplistic methodology of identifying the current expectations of rea-
sonably prudent members of our society. 158  A determination of
whether a particular privacy expectation can claim fourth amendment
protection requires not a factual determination by the reasonably pru-
dent man, but rather a constitutional determination by the Court. 159
Thus, "the heart of the controversy opened by Katz is the question of
what constitutes a justifiable expectation of privacy. "16I
By resorting to some rather strained reasoning, 16 1 the Court has
frequently avoided discussion of the methodology used to determine
"what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable.' ",162
When the Court openly refers to methodology, it generally limits its
discussion to the balancing of conflicting government and individual
interests. 163 In an unabashed recognition of the Court's approach, Jus-
tice Harlan, dissenting in United States v. *hite, 16 discussed the scope
of the fourth amendment. Justice Harlan stated that, in determining
155. Id at 351.
156. Id
157. United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.
App. 3d 836, 112 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1974); People v. Suerra, 21 Cal. App. 3d 534, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627
(1971).
158. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 384; Note, A Reconsideration ofthe Katz Expectation of
Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154 (1977).
159. Mr. Justice Douglas correctly noted that: "Obviously citizens must bear only those
threats to privacy which we decide to impose." United States v. Williamson, 405 U.S. 1026, 1029
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) in
which the Court stated: "Our problem, in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what
expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable'-what expectations the Fourth Amend-
ment will protect in the absence of a Warrant."
160. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication, supra note 24, at 335.
161. Bacigal, Observations, supra note 121, at 537.
162. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
163. In place of a balancing of interests, commentators have suggested that the fourth amend-
ment be interpreted to protect those claims of privacy which (1) are "natural or essential," Wein-
reb, supra note 6, at 83; (2) are "relatively serious," Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 1193, 1212 (1976); (3) reflect "society's generally shared expectations," Kitch, Katz v.
United States. The Limits ofthe Fourth Amendment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133, 137; or (4) recognize
"our shared intuitions of when privacy is or is not gained or lost," Parker, supra note 113, at 276.
164. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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whether the fourth amendment applies to a particular government ac-
tivity, the court must assess the "impact on the individual's sense of
security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of
law enforcement."' 65 If Justice Harlan correctly perceived the Court's
approach to fourth amendment issues, a balancing of conflicting inter-
ests may determine both the scope of the amendment and the required
level of probable cause under the amendment.' 66 If it is true that a
single methodology determines the coverage of the amendment and the
required level of probable cause, it is meaningless to speak of "The
Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satis-
fied."' 16 7
The Supreme Court's holding in Wyman v. James'68 illustrates
that the Court no longer pays serious attention to the difference be-
tween satisfying the fourth amendment and finding it inapplicable.
Wyman's primary holding that no fourth amendment intrusion had oc-
curred is set out in a single paragraph which contains no citation of
authority. 6 9 The majority opinion then devoted nine pages to establish
the reasonableness of the intrusion, assuming arguendo "that a
caseworker's homevisit, ... somehow . ..and despite its interview
nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the tradi-
tional sense. .. ,"70
Following Wyman's lead, many lower courts seem more comforta-
ble with an approach that assumes that a search has occurred and then
proceeds to balance conflicting state and individual interests to deter-
mine whether the search was reasonable. 17' Thus, with the recognition
of a sliding scale of probable cause, the significance of a threshold de-
termination of the amendment's coverage has greatly diminished. 72
The courts need not scrutinize government's activity to make an initial
assessment of whether the asserted privacy interest is protected by
traditional probable cause requirements or, alternatively, totally be-
yond the scope of fourth amendment protection. By adopting the Wy-
man approach, the Court has allowed itself the option of announcing
the results of the balancing process by holding that the government
interest was sufficient to set aside privacy or by holding that the privacy
interest was insufficient to trigger fourth amendment protection. Re-
gardless of the language used to express this determination, however,
165. Id at 786.
166. "The similarity in the Court's handling of the questions of what constitutes a search,
when does probable cause exist, and when may the police search without a warrant is striking."
Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication, supra note 24, at 364. See Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose
and the Right to Privacy. Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, II GA. L. REV. 75, 78 (1976).
167. See Moylan, supra note 150.
168. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
169. 400 U.S. at 317-18.
170. Id at 318.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
172. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 393; Greenberg, supra note 10, at 1047.
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the decision is the product of a single methodology-assessment of the
comparative weight of the government and individual interests in con-
flict. Thus, the sliding scale appears to have no lower limit; in addition,
courts balance interests to determine the scope of the amendment as
well as the required level of probable cause. 173
Although much debate has focused on the possible existence of a
lower limit to the sliding scale's application, scant attention has been
devoted to an analysis of a similar upper limit. The broad jurispruden-
tial question is the conflict between absolute privacy rights and utilita-
rian balancing;1 74  specifically, the question is whether the fourth
amendment recognizes some form of privacy which cannot be out-
weighed by any government interest. 7 5 One reading of Boyd v. United
States 76 and the "mere evidence" cases'7 7 may support the concept of
some absolute zone of privacy beyond the reach of the government's
power to search and seize.'7 8 The origin of this absolutely protected
zone of privacy has been attributed to a fourth amendment concept of
reasonableness; 7 9 to the fourth amendment's intimate relationship
with the fifth amendment;180 to a relationship with other constitutional
rights; 18 1 and to natural law and fundamental decency. 182 All of these
173. See Peebles, supra note 162, at 93, for the proposition that the sliding scale is widely used
in the lower courts to deal with "a substratum of governmental investigative activity which for
fourth amendment purposes falls short of a full search." The author further contends that "full"
searches should be governed by the rule that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. As
noted earlier, the per se approach focuses on whether the magistrate or the police officer should
determine probable cause, and does not deal with the required level of probable cause. See note 5
supra.
174. See generally Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, reprinted in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE 202 (2d series, A. Simpson ed. 1973).
175. Certain forms of privacy may be absolute or almost absolute rights. See, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (mother's right to terminate pregnancy in certain situations); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbra right to marital privacy).
176. 116 U.S. 616 (1885). The thrust of this broad reading of Boyd is explained in Amster-
dam, supra note 22, and Note, Legal Realism and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth Amendment, supra note 6.
177. See generaly Weinreb, supra note 6.
178. Dissenting in Warden v. Hayden, Mr. Justice Douglas saw the mere evidence rule as
recognizing a zone of privacy "that no police can enter .. " 387 U.S. at 312.
179. This theory is predicated on the idea that the reasonableness clause places substantive
restrictions on the power to search beyond the mandates of the warrant clause. See note 6 supra.
180. According to this view the close relationship between the fourth and fifth amendments
means that in some situations there is no difference between seizing incriminating items and com-
pelling an individual to be a witness against himself. See generally Note, Legal Realism and Con-
stitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, supra note 6.
181. Even searches based on probable cause may be unreasonable because they infringe on
other constitutional rights, such as the first amendment, according to this theory. See, e.g., Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (penumbral right to privacy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment protection).
182. Under this view, no matter how strong the government's need for an intrusion upon
privacy, natural law or the "social compact" theory of society places limits on the type of search
which a government may conduct. E.g., J. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 60 (1976) in which
the author states that one characteristic of positive law is recognition of the "division between a
sphere of social life that is sacred and untouchable and one that is subordinated to the sovereign's
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concepts share an emphasis on the nature of the items seized by the
government; none focus on the procedures utilized in making the
seizure.
In Andressen v. Maryland, 83 however, the Court gave a fairly defi-
nite "no" to the question of "whether there are items of evidential
value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a rea-
sonable search and seizure."' 84 The Court, understandably reluctant to
speak in terms of absolutes,185 considered only the item actually
seized-in this case, business records. 86 The broad language of An-
dressen implies, however, that no items, even personal diaries, are so
"private" that they are beyond the search and seizure powers of the
government. 187 The Andressen majority's analysis focused entirely on
the procedural aspects of the fourth and fifth amendments. The Court
did not attempt to define the nature of those items that are generally
entitled to constitutional protection from government searches. The
Court's failure to rule that no items are absolutely protected from a
government seizure is probably due to a sense of judicial propriety in
limiting its holding to the facts of the case; it does not indicate that the
Court is keeping an open mind on the question.
88
If the general language of Andressen accurately reflects the Court's
view of the fourth amendment, there is no upper limit to the operation
of a sliding scale of probable cause. Any form of privacy can be set
aside by a sufficiently weighty government interest, lending credence to
the phrase, "unique among the prohibitions and protected rights of the
first eight amendments to the Constitution, the Fourth Amendment
contains no absolutes .... 189 Typically, though, absolute rules are
tested and broken in hard cases which demonstrate the need for flex-
interests." See also Doss & Doss, On Morals, Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV.
395 (1971).
183. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
184. This question was the question left open in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967).
185. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). But see Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106 (1977) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
186. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) the Court had noted that: "Special
problems of privacy which might be presented by subpeona of a personal diary. . . are not in-
volved here." Id at 401 n.7.
187. See generally McKenna, supra note 6.
188. The Court may well regard the question of absolutely protected zones of privacy as a
largely academic question and does not seem disposed to answer questions such as the following:
Is there a difference between "absolute" absolutes and absolutes of the particular case? Does it
matter if a particular Court opinion states that a certain form of privacy can never be intruded
upon, or if the opinion states that a certain form of privacy can never be intruded upon based on
the justification offered in the case? Does phrasing a case holding in terms of an "absolute" abso-
lute preclude the Court from defining, confining and distinguishing the absolute in future cases?
In defining an absolute right to privacy will not the Court have to balance the need for an absolute
right to privacy against the need to search in each case?
189. Cook, Varieties of Detention andthe Fourth Amendment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 287 (1971). See
also White, supra note 141, at 231, where the author asserts: "No fourth amendment interest is
absolute."
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ibility in a dramatic fashion.190 People v. Sirhan'9' may have presented
one such hard case. The government action in Sirhan, a warrantless
search of a private dwelling and seizure of a personal diary, intruded
upon what society generally considers intimately private.1 92 Balanced
against these interests was the community interest in dispelling the po-
tential panic that could follow a political assassination. The Supreme
Court of California had no difficulty with this "hard" case and struck
the balance in favor of the government, stating,
The crime was one of enormous gravity, and the "gravity of the
offense" is an appropriate factor to take into consideration. The
victim was a major presidential candidate, and a crime of violence
had already been committed against him. The crime thus involved
far more than idle threats. Although the officers did not have rea-
sonable cause to believe that the house contained evidence of a
conspiracy to assassinate prominent political leaders, we believe
that the mere possibility that there might be such evidence in the
house fully warranted the officers' actions. It is not difficult to en-
visage what would have been the effect on this nation if several
more political assassinations had followed that of Senator Ken-
nedy. 193
If the "mere possibility" of furthering an important government inter-
est outweighs important privacy rights in a dwelling and a diary, it is
unlikely that any absolute right to privacy exists.
Assuming that the fourth amendment embodies no absolutes, it
becomes relevant to ask if the sliding scale of probable cause is indeed
a slipping slope that will allow shocking invasions of privacy to protect
extraordinary government interests. If it is, the Court could strike a
balance in favor of the government to allow some form of torture or
bodily intrusion to force an individual to reveal the location of a pi-
rated nuclear weapon. But if the amendment does contain absolutes,
where and how are they to be found: natural law, tradition, consensus,
or the judge's own values? Such questions cut to the heart of constitu-
tional and jurisprudential principles.' 94 If the Court is to find absolute
principles outside the fourth amendment, so be it. A reading of the
history and language of the amendment, however, does not suggest any
190. Cf. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication, supra note 24, in which the author states:
Everyone knows that absolute certainty is impossible and that a hard case can be put in
which any rule will fail. What we too often forget, though, is that not all cases are hard ones.
Most are readily classifiable instances of frequently recurring conduct. Sometimes, as in the
fourth amendment cases, the peculiarity and unintelligibility of the law itself are largely re-
sponsible for making easy cases hard ones.
Id at 367.
191. 7 Cal. 3d 710, 497 P.2d 1121, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972).
192. The California Supreme Court did not consider whether the diary was absolutely pro-
tected by the fourth amendment, because the issue was deemed to be waived by trial counsel. _d
at 740, 497 P.2d at 1141, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
193. Id at 739, 497 P.2d at 1140, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 404 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
194. For a brief but excellent consideration of these questions, see Ely, supra note 22.
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absolutely protected zone of privacy.195 A more appropriate interpreta-
tion recognizes that the fourth amendment is a wholly relativistic
means of regulating government intrusions upon privacy;196 and, ac-
cordingly, that the sliding scale has no upper limits to its operation.
V. BALANCING FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERESTS: THE
METHODOLOGY OF THE SLIDING SCALE
Under the balancing approach, a court makes its probable cause
determination by comparing the magnitude of the conflicting govern-
ment and individual interests. 197 When government and privacy inter-
ests are at odds, a court must adopt and apply some methodology to
identify underlying societal values, attach relative weights to these val-
ues, and strike the constitutionally appropriate balance. Prior to its
adoption of the balancing test, the Supreme Court had often deter-
mined the constitutional reasonableness of a search through a totality
of the circumstances test.' 98 This test, a non-methodology in reality,
was accurately described by Professor Weinreb as a cataloguing of facts
followed by an unconnected conclusion regarding the search's reasona-
bleness. 199 In fact, the totality of circumstances test can be character-
ized as an "I know it when I see it" school of jurisprudence. 200
Similarly, though, pseudo-sophisticated balancing tests20 ' often suffer
195. See note 197 infra.
196. Criticism of the relativistic view of the fourth amendment comes not only from those
who advocate some absolute right to privacy, but also from those who advocate the merits of
certainty in controlling police conduct. See Dworkin, Fact Style Adudication, supra note 24, at
365.
197. The premise, while by no means historically or logically inescapable, is certainly defensi-
ble. Historically, the fourth amendment was primarily concerned with two recognized abuses;
general warrants and writs of assistance. See Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1966); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1937). However, if it is accepted that "the genius of the found-
ing fathers lies in their development of an instrument capable of matching ingenious attempts by
the government to outflank its protections," United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir.
1975), then history gives little guidance on when and how the amendment protects individuals
against the great variety of present government intrusions into their lives. If the Court interprets
the amendment as protecting values beyond the interest in being free of general warrants and
writs of assistance, some ordering of social values is essential; all cannot be given equal weight.
Recognition of a hierarchy of fourth amendment values and the need to balance these values is
simply a recognition that "we must consider the two objects of desire, both of which we cannot
have, and make up our minds which to choose." Olmstead v. United States, 277. U.S. 438, 470
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
198. Eg., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
199. Weinreb, supra note 6, at 57.
200. One commentator has noted that:
We may be on the threshold of a fourth amendment jurisprudence in which the only question
is whether the Supreme Court believes a police practice to be "reasonable." No one can
know what meaning will be given such a term, just as no one can know what "privacy" will
be made to mean.
White, supra note 141, at 170.
201. Professor Amsterdam counseled that we must resist "the understandable temptation to
be responsive to every relevant shading of every relevant variation of every relevant complex-
ity. ... Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 375. See also Unger, supra note 182, at 197. Professor
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from the same type of nonstandardized decisionmaking. In the ex-
treme, the balancing approach asks two related fundamental questions:
(1) how much and what type of privacy does a reasonably free society
require; and (2) how much and what type of an intrusion upon privacy
is required to further a reasonably ordered society. 202 Faced with this
type of question, 20 3 and told by countless commentators that it is mak-
ing moral and political decisions based on its conception of a "good"
society,2 4 it is not surprising that on occasion the Court has thrown up
its hands and made no attempt to explain its holding.20 5
On other occasions the Court has conceded that the totality of cir-
cumstances test is little more than a statement of personal values20 6 and
has recognized the need for a "more precise analysis. ' 2 7 In theory the
sliding scale of probable cause improves upon the nebulous totality test
by identifying three criteria for determining reasonableness: (1) the
weight of the government interest justifying the intrusion; (2) the sever-
ity of the intrusion into individual privacy; and (3) the feasibility of
alternative procedures.208 In the final analysis, however, the sliding
scale of probable cause does not provide a more standardized ap-
proach. In fact, an analysis of the Court's use of these three factors, in
isolation and in relation to each other, reveals no meaningful progress
beyond the ad hoc totality of the circumstances test.
Unger points out that, "if the number of pertinent factors of decision is too large, and each of
them is constantly shifting, then categories of classification or criteria of analogy will be hard to
draw and even harder to maintain." Id at 197.
202. See, e.g., Justice Jackson's description of the Bill of Rights as "the maximum restrictions
on the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with the maintenance of
organized society itself." Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). See
also Landynski, supra note 197, who notes that the issues raised under the fourth amendment
"bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state." Id at 13.
203. "No answer is what the wrong question begets .. " A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER-
OUS BRANCH 55 (1962). One answer such a question might beget is that "a search which proves
the person searched to be guilty of a crime is by that very fact shown to have been a search made
in the public interest, and thereby becomes reasonable." Waite, supra note 51, at 632. See also
People v. Meyers, 38 App. Div. 2d 484, 330 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1972).
204. E.g., Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princioles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I
(1959); Waite, supra note 51, at 623; Fuller, Reason and Fiat, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946).
205. See text accompanying notes 283-85 infra.
206. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1969).
207. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1969). Cf. Tribe, supra note 46, where
the author discusses the desirability of "precise and rigorous techniques of analysis." Id at 1331.
Professor Tribe then compares, "the wisdom of being somewhat fuzzy and open-ended in one's
statement of at least some kinds of standards and procedures. Id at 1390. See also Fuller,
supra note 204.
208. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967). The Court in
Camara made only passing reference to the third factor, alternative procedures, see text accompa-
nying notes 241-62 infra, and noted another factor: "a long history of judicial and public accept-
ance." 387 U.S. at 537. The historical acceptance factor is of dubious validity and weight. See
LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 45, at 14. Cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)
(Court emphasized historical practice of arresting suspected felons in public without a warrant).
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A. The Operation of the Sliding Scale. Determining the Value of the
Government's Purpose
The possible justifications for intruding upon individual privacy
are practically infinite.20 9 In non-criminal situations, they range from
photographing political demonstrators210 to protecting underprivileged
children. 21 ' Government interests in traditional criminal law searches
range from checking for violations of automobile registration laws 212 to
apprehending vicious murderers. 213 The sliding scale's difficulty begins
with a recognition that it must define the ways in which and the extent
to which the government's interests differ.
Consider only one small aspect of the problem-whether to assign
weight to the government interest according to the severity of a particu-
lar crime. 2  The Court could begin its fourth amendment inquiry by
attaching relative weights to each crime listed in a criminal code. Al-
ternatively, the Court could assign weights to distinct categories of
crime, such as violence against a person, crimes against property,
crimes that are malum in se, and so on. Having undertaken this task,
the Court would immediately have to decide whether it should defer to
a state legislature's evaluation of the severity of a crime or formulate a
national uniform scale identifying the government interest in prevent-
ing each type of offense. This attempt to highlight the problem may be
criticized as a dare to the Court to draw a line, only to subsequently
attack the wisdom of that decision. A criticism of the ultimate wisdom
of where the line is drawn, however, is separable from an evaluation of
the process used to arrive at the legal standard. Accordingly, the point
to be made here is that, unfortunately, the courts and commentators
suggesting that the severity of a crime is an appropriate factor in the
balancing process have not proposed a viable methodology for ranking
the various offenses.2 is
Moreover, those who suggest that the Court's balancing test in-
clude a reference to the severity of the crime appear to ignore that most
searches occur at an early stage of the prosecutorial process, long
209. See text accompanying notes 86-91 supra.
210. In Donohue v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308, 309 (E.D. Va. 1971), the court stated: "[lt has
long been the policy in Richmond and other places throughout the nation to photograph persons
participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities whether peaceful or other-
wise."
211. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
212. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
213. People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 740, 497 P.2d 1121, 1141, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 405 (1972).
214. For suggestions that the severity of the crime is an appropriate factor, see, e.g., LaFave,
Street Encounters, supra note 45, at 57-58; Barett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth
Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46, 63; Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court.- Shadows
on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 669 (1961). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); People v.
Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 740, 497 P.2d 1121, 1141, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 405 (1972); Greenberg, supra
note 10, at 1040.
215. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
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before the severity of the crime is known with certainty. In contrast, by
the time an appellate court rules on the constitutionality of a search, the
litigants typically have established the nature of the alleged crime with
precision. To effectuate the purposes of the exclusionary rule, a court
considering the severity of the crime would have to distinguish the
agent's perception of the crime before the intrusion from the nature of
the offense subsequently discovered. By way of illustration, consider
the following two situations. First, upon hearing loud screams from an
apartment, a police officer reasonably concludes that someone's life is
in immediate danger. He enters the apartment and finds an uninhib-
ited couple engaged in illegal fornication. Second, a police officer de-
tects an odor from an apartment which he reasonably believes is the
smell of burning marijuana. He enters the apartment and finds that the
odor comes from a cauldron where neighborhood children are being
boiled. In both situations the court faces almost unbearable pressure to
evaluate the government's justification for initiating the search in light
of the facts known at trial.216 The danger of hindsight judgment is a
familiar fourth amendment problem that inheres in the remedy of ex-
clusion of evidence at trial. The typicality of this problem, however,
does not reduce its stature or its impact on a methodology that would
include an assessment of the severity of crimes.
Proponents of the sliding scale analysis have also suggested that
the courts consider "the need for evidence in a particular case" 21 7 as
another important factor in weighing the government's need to search.
Again, the danger of hindsight judgment casts doubt on the wisdom of
this suggestion. For example, one commentator fell into the trap of
arguing that the government's need to search in a particular case was
de minimus because the seized evidence was merely used to corrobo-
rate what the defendant conceded at trial.218 This type of Monday
morning quarterbacking ignores the fact that at the time of the search
the government had no way of knowing what, if anything, the defend-
ant would concede at trial. Moreover, this approach would require the
magistrate or police officer to become familiar with the prosecution's
entire case-and as much as is known about the case for the defense-
to assess what contribution a particular piece of evidence would make
to the likelihood of a conviction. Thus, even if judicial hindsight is
avoided, consideration of the government's need for evidence in a case
is not feasible or appropriate.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty in assessing the importance of the
216. The Court has recognized the problem of hindsight judgments: "after-the-event justifi-
cation for the . . . search [is] too likely to be subtlely influenced by the familiar shortcomings of
hindsight judgment." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964).
217. Weinreb, supra note 6, at 70.
218. Note, Fourth Amendment Balancing and Searches into the Body, 31 MIAMI L. REV. 1504,
1515 (1977).
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government's purpose in searching, however, lies in establishing what
that purpose was. Must the Court accept at face value the govern-
ment's characterization of its interest in searching? Or is the Court free
to determine what the interest must have been?2" 9 In Cady v. Dom-
browski,22° the Court upheld a warrantless search on the ground that
the police were performing "community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.I22' In upholding the
search, the Court apparently attached great significance to the "specific
motivation" of the intruding officer, describing it as a "concern for the
safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder
removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle. 222
Assuming that Dombrowski means that the Court will consider the
specific motivation of the intruding officer, the government will be able
to offer some broad societal interest beyond obtaining incriminating
evidence in many cases.223 For example, the government could argue
that although the police seized heroin as evidence for a criminal prose-
cution, the officer in charge had reason to believe that this particular
heroin would be distributed to school children at the local junior high
school. The Court has little basis for rejecting such questionable con-
tentions in view of the difficulty of discerning the officer's subjective
intent. Thus, in those cases in which the government can plausibly ar-
ticulate a special community interest, the Dombrowski approach seems
to grant the prosecution a significant advantage.
To date, however, the Supreme Court has not offered much gui-
dance as to what considerations are relevant in assessing the govern-
ment's interest. Although the Court has provided conclusory labels
that a government interest is "legitimate and weighty, "224 "urgent, "225
and "vital, ' 226 it has not put forth the methodology used to reach such
conclusions.
. Assessing the Severity of the Intrusion into an Individual's Privacy
The higher the required level of probable cause, the more the law
affirms the dignity of the individual and displays respect for a particu-
219. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Court refused to accept the police
officer's statement that he was searching for the suspect or stolen money and concluded that the
officer must have been searching for weapons. Id at 299-300.
220. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
221. Id at 441.
222. Id at 447.
223. Mr. Justice Jackson recognized this tendency stating: "We must remember that the ex-
tent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret
and apply themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
224. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977).
225. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972).
226. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658 (1979).
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lar form of privacy. When the Court falls prone to speaking of privacy
as primarily a right to hide seizable evidence,227 the defendant's obvi-
ous guilt may influence the assessment of how much constitutional pro-
tection he should receive.228 Certainly an individual's privacy interest
is not limited to the right to hide incriminating evidence.229 Catalogu-
ing those rights encompassed within an individual's privacy interest,
however, is far more difficult than excluding those that lie beyond its
protection.230 Given the difficulty of that initial task, it is no wonder
that the process of assigning weights to the different privacy interests
that have emerged has not yielded a principled methodology.
Some have suggested that the language of the fourth amendment
itself recognizes a rough scale of privacy values. That is, in speaking of
persons, houses, and papers, the amendment arguably accords these
forms of privacy special protection.23' The Supreme Court's fourth
amendment decisions do not support this reasoning, however. In An-
dressen v. Aaryand,2 3 2 for example, the Court did not appear to attach
any special significance to the fact that the amendment refers to papers.
Similarly, the Court did not openly distinguish the search and seizure
of a person from other intrusions in United States v. Watson.2 33
The strongest argument based on the amendment's language is
that dwellings are entitled to special fourth amendment protection.
History reveals that the framers were concerned about this kind of in-
trusion.234 Indeed, the Court's clearest recognition of a hierarchy of
privacy interests has been expressed in its frequent observation that
"there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. .. 235
In Silverman v. United States,2 36 the Court expressed that principle
more strongly:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
227. See generally Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right of
Privacy, 26 REC. N.Y.B.A. 546 (1971); Parker, supra note 117.
228. E.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). In considering whether the de-
fendant's obvious guilt is a factor in interpreting the amendment, it is important to remember that
it was "the unrestrained search for smuggled goods that brought the fourth amendment into be-
ing." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 57 (1966).
229. See text accompanying notes 92-97 supra.
230. The right to privacy "like a chameleon, has a different color for every turning." Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM (1967); Genely, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 233 (1977); Parker,
supra note 117.
231. Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 392.
232. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
233. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson the Court "lowered" the protections of the fourth
amendment by upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless arrest in a public area. The Court
did not even discuss the possibility that a higher standard of probable cause was required because
the seizure of a "person" is referred to in the language of the amendment. See Ingram v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 679 (1977).
234. See Lasson, supra note 197.
235. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
236. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
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house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowl-
edge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitu-
tion. That is still a sizeable hunk of liberty-worth protecting
from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide
some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some inculated
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's
castle.237
Assuming that the fourth amendment does recognize that "the good
society must have . . .[some] protected crannies for the soul, '2 38 the
Court has not yet articulated the basis for its conclusion that a dwelling
is one of these specially protected areas.
Justice Douglas, perhaps the strongest advocate of a specially pro-
tected zone of privacy, rejected the notion that this zone could be de-
fined in terms of places. 239 Perhaps the Andressen majority took the
logical step of treating this specially protected zone of privacy, this
"cranny for the soul," as being confined to the soul itself.2" If the lan-
guage and history of the fourth amendment do not establish specially
protected forms of privacy, the Court must find another source of refer-
ence in scaling the individual's right to privacy under the balancing
approach. If the Justices have found a source other than subjective ad
hoc judgments, the Court has yet to reveal it. To date, the Court has
only spoken of the severity of intrusions upon privacy in conclusory
terms.
C Determining the Feasibility of Alternative Procedures
Simplistically stated, this third aspect of the balancing test recog-
nizes that a government infringement upon individual privacy may be
deemed unreasonable because a less intrusive alternative procedure ex-
isted which could have accomplished the same end at less cost to indi-
vidual privacy. The Court flirted with the less restrictive alternative
analysis in Chambers v. Maroney,24 but with the possible exception of
Delaware v. Prouse,24 2 no fourth amendment case has given serious
consideration to this factor. Most often courts have disposed of the
237. Id at 511 n.4. (emphasis added) (quoting Frank, J., dissenting, United States v. On Lee,
193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (1951)). It is difficult to read such language literally in light of lower court
opinions dealing with the inviolatability of a dwelling. See Comment, A Man 's Home is His Fort,
23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63 (1974).
238. Reich, supra note 22, at 1172.
239. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 321 (1967).
240. Dissenting in Andressen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), Mr. Justice Brennan implied
that the majority had confined "the dominion of privacy to the mind. 427 U.S. 487 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
241. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Mr. Justice White applied the doctrine to the facts of Chambers
before rejecting it: "Arguably, only the 'lesser intrusion' [immobilizing a car] is permissible until
the Magistrate authorizes [a search by issuing a warrant]." Id at 51. See also Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967), where the majority suggested that more scientific and less obtrusive
procedures could be developed for apprehending criminals.
242. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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feasibility of alternative procedures in a one-sentence conclusory refer-
ence to the lack of practical alternatives.243
At first blush it is surprising that the less restrictive alternative doc-
trine, long an accepted approach in applying other constitutional provi-
sions, 244 has not received serious attention in fourth amendment cases.
The doctrine appears well suited for fourth amendment analysis, par-
ticularly in light of the amendment's standard of reasonableness.
When two possible methods of achieving the government's purpose ex-
ist, it is reasonable to require the use of the less intrusive practice.245
The Court cannot easily define the required level of probable cause as a
forty percent or sixty percent likelihood that the intrusion will further
the government interest without considering what alternatives are nec-
essary to achieve the sixty percent likelihood.
The Court's failure to give serious attention to the less restrictive
alternative doctrine in fourth amendment cases is probably due, not to
a belief that the doctrine is irrelevant, but rather to a realization that no
existing methodology evaluates the relative restrictiveness and effi-
ciency of various alternatives. The Court is obviously reluctant to spec-
ulate on proposed procedures which are theoretically more efficient and
less restrictive than existing practices. 246 For example, the defendant in
United States P. Martinez-Fuerte2 47 argued that legislation prohibiting
the knowing employment of illegal aliens would be a less restrictive
and more efficient means of serving the government's interest in check-
ing the flow of illegal aliens.2 48 The Court gave short shrift to this ar-
gument by noting that "the logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-
alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of
virtually all search and seizure powers. 2 49 The Court seems reluctant
to speculate on the virtues of proposed alternatives; perhaps it would
confine the less restrictive alternative analysis to an evaluation of ex-
243. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, where the Court stated, "It is doubt-
ful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results." Id at 537. The re-
quirement for an arrest warrant "would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law
enforcement .. " Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975). See also United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
244. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (equal protection); Shelton v. Tuck-
er, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
245. Cf. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Crimes, unspeak-
ably horrible crimes, are with us in this country, and we cannot afford to dispense with any known
method of detecting and correcting them unless it is forbidden by the Constitution .. ") See
also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). When considering the needs of law enforcement agen-
cies to combat "rising crime rates," it is interesting to note that some 300 years ago Lord Hale
authorized search warrants on the ground of "necessity especially in these times, where felonies
and robberies are so frequent." J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
26-27 (1966).
246. "It is always easy to hint at mysterious means available just around the corner to catch
outlaws." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 73 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
247. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
248. 1d at 556-57.
249. Id
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isting practices which presumably have an established track record of
efficiency.25°
Delaware v. Prouse25' may be the first case in which the Supreme
Court held a search unconstitutional because the authorities failed to
use an established less restrictive alternative procedure. In that case,
the state sought to establish the constitutionality of "random stops" 252
of automobiles to check motorists' drivers licenses and car registrations.
A majority of the Supreme Court accepted the government's contention
that random stops furthered a "vital" state interest in promoting high-
way safety.253 Having recognized the utility of random stops, the Court
admitted its willingness to uphold the searches if "in the service of
these important ends, the discretionary spot check is a sufficiently pro-
ductive mechanism to justify the intrusion upon Fourth Amendment
interests which such stops entail. 254 The state, however, was unable to
offer any statistics to prove its claim that random stops are more effi-
cient than the less intrusive checkpoint stops formerly used by the au-
thorities.25 5 Assuming that the Prouse holding did turn on the
availability of a less restrictive alternative,256 it becomes apparent that
the Court placed the burden of proving the superiority of the more
intrusive procedure on the government. 57 In other words, Prouse
found the state's practice unconstitutional on the basis of the state's
inability to demonstrate that the method was "sufficiently productive"
250. But the lower court decision in Martinez-Fuerte was based on an assessment of the estab-
lished track record of fixed checkpoints. Statistics showed that only five percent of the illegal
aliens passing through the checkpoint were apprehended, and that operations at the border (utiliz-
ing less manpower) had apprehended three times the number of aliens located by all traffic-check-
ing programs. Thus the lower court decision was seen as forcing "the Border Patrol into a more
effective allocation of its manpower." Note, Alien Checkpoints and the Troublesome Tetrology
United States v. Martnez-Fuerte, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 267 (1976).
251. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
252. When asked "whether the officer here was following orders to make random stops or
whether he just did!' ", counsel for the state responded, "[hle just did it." In response to Justice
Powell's inquiry as to why the Delaware police weren't using designated checkpoints to stop all
motorists, counsel explained: "[r]andom stops can be done by police when they really don't have
anything else to do." 47 U.S.L.W. 3491 (1979).
253. 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979).
254. Id at 659.
255. See 47 U.S.L.W. 3491 (1979). Several courts have asserted, however, that random road
checks are the most efficient means available to enforce registration and license requirements.
E.g., State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb. 337, 339, 321 N.W.2d 672, 675 (1975); State v. Kabayama, 98
N.J. Super. 85, 85-87, 231 A.2d 164, 166 (1967).
256. Prouse can also be analyzed from the perspective which views the fourth amendment as
prohibiting the unfettered discretion of police officers. See generally Bacigal, Observations, supra
note 121. Prouse was given such a reading in Brown v. Texas, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641
(1979), in which the Court cited Prouse for the proposition that "when such a stop is not based on
objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits."
257. The state's contention that random spot checks promoted highway safety was character-
ized as a "mere assertion" and the Court noted the absence of any supporting "empirical data."
440 U.S. at 659-60. Compare Mr. Justice Rehnquist's approach: "The burden is not upon the
State to demonstrate that its procedures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment, but upon
respondent to demonstrate that they are not." 440 U.S. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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in relation to less intrusive alternatives to justify the greater infringe-
ment on privacy rights.
The state's failure in Prouse raises the question of whether over-
worked and underfunded prosecutors will be able to gather the empiri-
cal data necessary to meet this burden with any frequency. In addition,
Professor Gilmore has leveled severe criticism at judicial use of empiri-
cal evidence, pointing out that "the gathered facts have a disappointing
way of turning out not to mean anything beyond themselves.-
258
Moreover, ascertaining the degree of infringement on privacy and the
procedure's deterrent value requires a determination of the search's
long-term effect on an individual's state of mind. The deficiencies of
judicial reliance on empirical data are particularly acute when the
court is attempting to measure these essentially nonquantifiable factors.
The court must then compare nebulous findings with concrete meas-
ures of the cost of the additional manpower or machinery necessary to
implement an alternative procedure. One can easily foresee a tendency
for these more "readily quantifiable variables to dwarf those that are
harder to measure .... "259 Accordingly, the proponent of broad pri-
vacy protection must often argue that the largely unmeasurable deter-
rent and educative effects of alternative procedures will outweigh the
more apparent costs of restricting law enforcement methods.26° Simi-
larly, the proponent of state intrusions, in a case such as Prouse, must
argue that the long run deterrence of unfit drivers outweighs the more
immediate effects on privacy.
Of course no fact-finding process, judicial or otherwise, can wholly
eliminate the decisionmaker's uncertainty about the consequences of
any chosen strategy of conduct. The Court's application of the less re-
strictive alternative doctrine, however, has been superficial,26 ' giving
little attention to the problems of making the doctrine a meaningful
part of the fourth amendment jurisprudence.262 If Prouse indicates that
258. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 88 (1977).
259. Tribe, supra note 46, at 1393.
260. As Professor Weinreb has pointed out:
It is a risky business to speculate how human beings will adapt to a changed environ-
ment. . . .There is no way to establish that our behavior now is better (more "natural," or
more "human," or more pleasant) than it would be if we expected and had less privacy. In
the end we must rely on an unproved vision of man in society.
Weinreb, supra note 6, at 83.
261. See text accompanying notes 244-50 supra. See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and
the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 472 (1969).
262. Application of the less restrictive alternative doctrine to the fourth amendment raises a
number of problems: (1) Should the Court consider whether prohibiting a certain procedure will
encourage police to use procedures not covered by the fourth amendment which are illegal or even
less desirable than the prohibited procedure? For example, if the danger of third party destruction
does not justify a warrantless search, will the police illegally arrest all third parties, in effect,
freezing the status quo until a warrant can be obtained. See 2 W. LAFAVE TREATISE, supra note
20, at 450; Waite, supra note 51, at 634. (2) Can the Court strike down a particular police proce-
dure, because, regardless of the effect upon individual privacy, there are less dangerous or more
economically efficient procedures? For example: "I have no reluctance in condemning as uncon-
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the Court is willing to give the doctrine greater effect, it is time to for-
mulate a proper judicial methodology for obtaining and evaluating the
needed empirical evidence.
D. Balancing the Factors
As this article has shown, a balancing approach to the fourth
amendment requires the Court to scale values within the three distinct
categories of government interests, individual privacy, and alternative
procedures.263 Beyond that initial task, however, lies the difficult prob-
lem of translating the three variables into a common language. Since
the adoption of the sliding scale, the Court has analyzed government
interests in the language of legitimate government power, evaluated the
nature of an intrusion in the language of privacy, and considered the
feasibility of alternatives in terms of efficiency and economy. The mys-
tery of how these distinct lines of analysis interrelate, however, remains
unsolved.
The goal of balancing may be "infinitely sensible ' 264 in that it
seeks to "directly correlate" 265 the importance of the government inter-
est with the severity of the intrusion upon privacy. But until the
method of correlating these factors is articulated, fourth amendment
decisions will continue to appear unprincipled. At present the selection
and description of the factors to be weighed largely predetermines the
outcome of any balancing process. 266 When the Court announces that
an "important and weighty" government interest was balanced against
a "de minimus" interest in privacy,267 the result is preordained. Thus,
the methodology used to balance such obviously loaded factors be-
comes irrelevant. So long as the Court continues to balance "in a to-
tally ad hoc fashion, any number of subjective factors, "268 no
methodology for comparing government interests is likely to emerge.
Conclusion
The recognition of a hierarchy of fourth amendment values is a
defensible approach; arguably, it raises fourth amendment jurispru-
stitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless and so fraught with danger and discredit to
the law enforcement agencies themselves." MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 461 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring). (3) To what extent may the Court make largely political determinations
regarding the amount of community resources that should be committed to various law enforce-
ment procedures? See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
263. "IF]or purposes of evaluation it is both possible and necessary to arrange the privacy and
the government interests on separate continuums." Rehnquist, Is an Eipanded Right of Privacy
Consistent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement?, 23 KANSAS L. REV. 1, 14 (1974).
264. Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 376.
265. People v. LaPene, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375. See also United
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
266. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 890 (Douglas, J., concurring).
267. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
268. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
No. 4]
LAW FORUM
dence from a simplistic monolithic concept to a more sophisticated ap-
preciation of the complexity of various conflicting governmental and
individual interests. As a methodology for resolving that conflict, how-
ever, the sliding scale of probable cause does not prove helpful. The
sliding scale theory does not articulate the mechanics of the balancing
process; in fact, the methodology used by the courts appears limited to
a simplistic formula-an acknowledgment that a balancing of interests
is appropriate and an announcement of the result in conclusory terms.
The Supreme Court's application of the balancing approach and the
resulting sliding scale of probable cause have not advanced our under-
standing of the parameters of fourth amendment protection. Rather,
this approach has thrown the lower courts into the methodological
abyss of determining the constitutional reasonableness of an intrusion
by interpreting the subjective evaluations of the Supreme Court.2 69
The increased objectivity resulting from a resurrection of the tradi-
tional probable cause approach would be purchased at a high price,
however. Simplistic notions of traditional probable cause ignore the
reality of differing government and individual interests that conflict
within the purview of the fourth amendment.27 ° In addition, a return
to traditional probable cause would contract the scope of fourth
amendment protection to cases of government intrusions incident to
criminal investigations.27' Moreover, in part, traditional probable
cause analysis merely hides a subjective balancing process behind the
rhetoric of objective reasoning. 2
If the Court cannot go backward to traditional probable cause, it
must go forward. But forward to what? The inherent weaknesses of
the sliding scale and traditional probable cause are obvious; superior
concepts, however, are not so readily apparent. Perhaps the solution
lies not in finding a new methodology to answer the old fourth amend-
ment questions, but rather in redefining the questions.273 In her classic
work Philosophy In a New Key 274 Susanne K. Langer noted that the
pursuit of any system of thought ultimately leads to "the unanswerable
puzzles, the paradoxes that always mark the limit of what a generative
idea, an intellectual vision, will do."' 275 The limit is reached when all
answerable questions have been addressed, leaving only those insoluble
269. As Professor LaFave has pointed out, "If the balancing technique is used, it would seem
to make no difference in terms of outcome whether the balancing is done merely to determine
what is reasonable or to determine what level of probable cause is required."LaFave, Street En-
counters, supra note 45, at 56 n.86.
270. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
271. Id.
272. See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
273. See G. GILMORE, supra note 258, at 100, noting that it is all too easy to convince oneself
"that the cause of past failure lay in inadequate methodology and that, with more refined tech-
niques, the trick will finally be pulled off."
274. S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as LANGER].
275. Id. at II
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metaphysical questions whose very statement harbors a paradox
wherein the question is capable of two or more equally good answers.
In that respect, Katz and Camara generated important and fruitful
thought on the concept of privacy and order in a free society. By ap-
proaching the fourth amendment inquiry in terms of privacy versus or-
der and security, however, we have reached the metaphysical question
which harbors a paradox. Certainly, the proper balance of liberty and
order in a free society is an appropriate question.276 At the same time
its abstractness obscures the realities of everyday life.277 The Court's
answers are not intellectual discoveries of "good" answers to appropri-
ate questions, however; they merely adhere to one doctrine and refute
the opposing doctrine. Each ansver to the paradox wins a certain
number of adherents who prefer it to an equally good rival answer. If
fourth amendment jurisprudence has reached this insoluble dilemma, it
is time to follow Professor Langer's suggestion: "If we would have new
knowledge, we must get. . . a whole world of new questions. '278
To date there have been only preliminary efforts to formulate new
fourth amendment questions. Professor Dworkin has raised the ques-
tion of whether the Court should adopt "an inflexible search and
seizure code" and rely on the due process clause for the flexibility
needed to handle situations in which the actions shock the conscience
of the Court.2 79 In a more limited context, Professor LaFave has also
examined the virtues of standardized fourth amendment procedures as
opposed to case-by-case adjudication.28 ° Professor LaFave's new ques-
tion, however, asks whether modification of the "plain view" principle
might eliminate some of the need for balancing privacy and law en-
276. See text accompanying notes 202-05 supra.
277. As Professor Ahrens has asserted,
The fundamental value at the base of the. . . fourth amendment is the commitment to treat-
ing persons who come before the law on the basis of their individual, particular, uncommon,
and odd property and attributes. Juristic procedures which help show the unique characteris-
tics of individuals and actions to the decision-maker provide the factual evidentiary base for
legal judgments which avoid abstract moral structures and remain useful as explanations of
external phenomena.
Ahrens, supra note 15, at 1082.
Of course, what is or is not reasonable under the particular circumstances still depends on
broad underlying policy determinations. The Court, however, may claim the authority to deter-
mine social policy within the context of a specific case, if only for the reason that someone has to
resolve the particular dispute. Even justice according to the length of the Chancellor's foot is
presumably preferable to anarchy. See Fried, Two Concepts of Interests." Some Rflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 75 HARV. L. REv. 755, 761 (1963), where the author states,
[t]he point is that authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are right--the au-
thority must pre-exist their right or wrong judgment and must survive it too--and judges
decide cases by virture of their authority, and not because they are any more likely to be right
than other people.
See also B. CARDOZO,THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
278. LANGER, supra note 274.
279. See Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 23.
280. See LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication'" Versus "Standardized Procedures, " supra note
23.
LAW FORUM
forcement needs. Professor White has questioned the extent to which
the language of fourth amendment analysis must be seen as a means of
communicating with and about people. 28' Professor Amsterdam has
asked about the role of police administrative regulations in determin-
ing a reasonable search.282 Following some of Professor Amsterdam's
analysis, I have elsewhere raised the question of the extent to which the
political process should assume responsibility for protecting fundamen-
tal privacy values.283
Of course, there is another alternative-to maintain the status quo.
The Court may continue the present approach of mixing, in some neb-
ulous fashion, rational analysis and unspoken assumptions about val-
ues.2 8 4 This approach would continue to produce rather fuzzy and
open-ended concepts and rules. Being fuzzy and open-ended has cer-
tain benefits, 285 but the Court is currently giving us too much of a good
thing. In this light compare these statements:
Very little that has been said in our previous decisions . . .
and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the lan-
guage of the amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed
formula for judging cases such as this.
Justice Rehnquist286
A body of law is more rational and more civilized when every
rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end
which it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are
stated or are ready to be stated in words.
Justice Holmes287
Depending on one's values, Justice Rehnquist may be lauded for
his candor, and Justice Holmes for his aspirations. Only if taken to the
281. See White, supra note 141.
282. See Amsterdam, supra note 22.
283. See Bacigal, Observations, supra note 121.
284. Highlighting the lack of clarity in the fourth amendment area, then Solicitor General
Griswold revealed that "[tihe average search and seizure case takes a little more than twice as
many pages as the average of all the cases decided by the Court. Griswold, Search and Seizure-A
Dilemma of the Supreme Court (Roscoe Pound Lectures, delivered at the University of Nebraska
College of Law, 18-19 March 1974), citedin LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 45. The lack of
clarity in this area is further exemplified by the fact that, "[iun 1977 alone, over 150 articles on
search and seizure were published in various legal journals and periodicals." Note, United States
v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept:" The Unreasonableness of Being Reasonable, 58
B.U.L. REV. 436, 437 n.14 (1978).
285. Every balancing test involves some discretion, and no known methodology can totally
eliminate all subjective judgments on the part of the decisionmaker. However, a methodology
which requires a systematic and thorough analysis of the issues and interests involved may help
limit this subjective discretion. See generally Wechsler, supra note 204.
286. Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973). See generally B. CARDOZO, supra note
103, at 117, where the author states, "[tihe ends to which courts have addressed themselves, the
reasons and motives that have guided them, have often been vaguely felt, intuitively or almost
intuitively apprehended, seldom explicitly avowed."
287. 0. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 186 (1920).
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extreme, however, will these statements become inconsistent.28 8 If the
Court accepted Justice Rehnquist's statement without reservation, it
should have ceased to write fourth amendment opinions. Because
opinions continue to be written, the Court must accept Justice Holmes's
statement to some extent; the Court, therefore, must recognize its duty
to improve upon its previous efforts at articulating the meaning of the
fourth amendment.
288. As Professor Fuller has pointed out, "[Il]aw is by its limitations fiat, by its aspirations
reason, the whole view involves recognition of both." Fuller, supra note 204, at 377.
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